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BRITISH ANTITRUST IN ACTION

Michael Conant*

l.

T

MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES AND COMBINATIONS

Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 19561 was the first positive anti-monopoly statute in the United Kingdom since the
Statute of Monopolies in 1623.2 Now that the statute has been in
effect four years there are sufficient decisions and consent orders to
make possible a report on its operation. Since most American
readers are unfamiliar with the legal and economic background of
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, the prior common law in this
area and the 1948 monopolies investigation statute will be summarized first. This summary is followed by an analysis of the
structure of the 1956 Act, of the nine decisions in litigated cases
and of the consent orders. The conclusion will evaluate the effectiveness of the act and contrast it with comparable United States
statutes.
HE

A.

Common-Law Background

Prior to 1956, monopolistic practices and combinations in
restraint of trade in the United Kingdom were subject to a number of uncoordinated and ineffective controls under the common
law.3 The Statute of Monopolies and the purported common-law
prohibition on monopolies applied only where one firm had entire
control of an industry and not to firms with limited monopoly
power or to cartels.4 The common-law rule that contracts in
restraint of trade were void did not prohibit such agreements but
merely impaired their enforcement. The early exemption to this
rule for contracts ancillary to the sale of a business which were
reasonable" was subsequently expanded to exempt most types of
• Associate Professor of Business Law, University of California (Berkeley). - Ed. The
author is indebted for assistance to B. M. Stephenson, Esq., and M. N. Ben-Levi, Esq., of
London, England, and to Professor Dow Votaw of the University of California. Financial
assistance for this research was received from the Social Science Research Council and the
Institute of Business and Economic Research of the University of California.
1 4 and 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68 (1956).
2 21 Jae. 1, c. 3 (1623).
3 For more detailed studies of the common law in this area, see FRIEDMANN, LAw AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 109-132 (1951); WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL &:
ELLES, LAW OF RESiRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES 20-122 (1957); Grunfeld &:
Yamey, United Kingdom, in FRIEDMANN (ed.), ANTI-TRUST LAws: A COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM 340-402 (1956); FRANK, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL LAW 201-33 (1950).
4 Churchill, Monopolies, 41 L.Q. REv. 275 (1925); Simpson, How Far Does the Law of
England Forbid Monopoly? 41 L.Q. REv. 393 (1925).
5 Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711); Nordenfelt v. Maxim
Nordenfelt Guns &: Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535.
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direct agreements to fix prices, output or market shares.6 The
tort of conspiracy as a remedy against the predatory practices of
trade combinations was rendered ineffective by a ruling that such
practices were legal if their primary motive was a business purpose
(profits) and not pure malice.7
The decline of common-law legal protection to traders coincided with the greatest period of industrial expansion and increased trade. Freedom of contract was extended to include
freedom to combine, and when it conflicted with freedom from
restraints of trade, the former was given precedence. Professor
Friedmann suggests that judges, coming from the same social
background as business people and imbued with Benthamite concepts of absolute freedom, thought it was not the function of the
law to intervene in market rivalries or combinations.8 They failed
to see that aggregations of market power enabled some firms to
destroy the freedom of trade that the common law professed to
protect.9 The result was that in the twentieth century trade
associations dominated almost every United Kingdom industry
and pursued programs to limit entry and control prices.10
6 See citations in GRUNFELD 8e YAMEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 349-50. See Letwin,
The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 355 (1954). Estab·
lishing the invalidity of these contracts was limited by the rule of evidence holding inadinissible evidence of actual or probable economic consequences of such an agreement.
Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow 8e Co., [1892] A.C. 25, 45; North West Salt Co. v.
Electrolytic Alkali Co., [1914] A.C. 461, 470. Another aid to internal enforcement of trade
combinations, although usually unnecessary in light of the weakened common law of
restraint of trade, was registration as a trade union (legally enforceable combination)
under the Trade Union Act of 1871. Joseph Evans 8e Co. v. Heathcote, [1918] 1 K.B. 418;
CITRINE, Tlw>E UNION LAW 295-305 (1950).
7 Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow 8e Co., [1892] A.C. 25. A Lord Justice of Appeal
recently described the Mogul decision as follows: "This judgment is indeed the Charter
of Trade Associations." Right Hon. Sir Henry Slesser in the Times (London), Feb. 7,
1955, 9. This is in contrast to the contemporaneous Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 in the
United States, which Mr. Justice Douglas has characterized as "the charter of freedom."
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). For a review of the
cases sanctioning commercial boycotts in the United Kingdom, see Sorrell v. Smith, [1925]
A.C. 700; Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch, (1942] A.C. 435.
8 FRIEDMANN, LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 121 (1951); Hunter,
Competition and the Law, 27 MANCHESTER SCHOOL 52, 56 (1959).
9 Lewis, Monopoly and the Law, 6 MODERN L. REV. 97 (1943).
10 PEP (Political and Economic Planning), INDUSTRIAL TRADE AssOCIATIONS (1957).
The period between the two World Wars, one of almost continuous depression in the
United Kingdom, saw the further decline of public faith in competition as a regulator of
business activity. People generally confused the failure of the enterprise system to provide
full employment, a problem of monetary-fiscal policy, with the question of whether the
free competitive system would maximize output of the employed, a problem of resource
allocation. This social climate favored the increased growth of trade associations and
their monopolistic control of industry.
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B. Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and

Control) Act, 1948
The first sign of a reversal of the public attitude of complacency
toward monopoly came during World War II. The White Paper
on Employment Policy issued by the war-time Coalition Government indicated that the full employment policy required supplemental activity to investigate and act against restrictive agreements
and combines detrimental to the country.11 The Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act of 1948 resulted.12
The 1948 Act cannot be termed a positive anti-monopoly law since
it did not prohibit or penalize any monopolistic practice or restrictive agreement. The act created a Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices Commission, members to be appointed by the Board of
Trade, to make inquiries into industries and trades and report
thereon. The Commission reports were to form the basis for
possible remedial action by the government. The Board of Trade
was empowered to order a Commission investigation of the supply,
processing or export of goods of any description if one-third of the
supply of such goods in the United Kingdom or a substantial part
of the United Kingdom were supplied or processed by one firm,
or two or more firms which conducted themselves in any way to
prevent or restrict competition. It could also request the Commission to state in its report whether it considered any monopolistic practice that was found to exist was contrary to the public
interest. The public interest was defined in section 14 of the act
in fairly specific economic terms.13
11 CMD. No. 6527, iJ 54 (1944).
12 ll & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66 (1948). Minor amendments to this act are in the Monopolies
and Restrictive Practices Commission Act. I & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 51 (1953). For more detailed
discussions of the 1948 and 1953 Acts, see GUENAULT & JACKSON, THE CONTROL OF MONOP·
OLY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1960); GRUNFELD & YAMEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 361-402;
Meier, A Critique of the New British Monopoly Act, 48 MICH. L. REv. 329 (1950); Lewis,
The British Monopolies Act, 16 MANCHESTER SCHOOL 208 (1949).
13 Section 14 lists the objectives in determining whether a practice is in the public
interest as follows:
" (a) the production, treatment and distribution by the most efficient and economical
means of goods of such types and qualities, in such volume and at such prices as will
best meet the requirements of home and overseas markets;
"(b) the organisation of industry and trade in such a way that their efficiency is
progressively increased and new enterprise is encouraged;
"(c) the fullest use and best distribution of men, materials, and industrial capacity
in the United Kingdom; and
" (d) the development of technical improvements and the expansion of existing
markets and the opening up of new markets."
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Pursuant to reference by the Board of Trade, the Commission
made twenty industry reports14 between 1950 and 1957, the year
the new Restrictive Practices Court took over a large part of its
tasks. In sixteen of the industries, the Commission found monopoly conditions contrary to the public interest.15 Enforcement
of the 1948 Act was left to the Board of Trade in such cases as it
thought the Commission's recommendations should be implemented. In most cases this involved negotiation with the firms
and trade associations to secure commitments from them to discontinue the objectionable practices. No method of policing such
commitments was provided in the act. In fact, a supplementary
investigation of compliance with the recommendations in the
Imported Timber report showed that, for two of the three major
types of timber, new restrictive arrangements had been adopted
to replace the old.16 In only one case, dental goods, was a statutory
order issued. Agreements to withhold supplies from dealers where
this may limit the number of dealers or secure the maintenance of
resale prices was made unlawful.1 7
The Commission was asked to make one general report on
collective discrimination.18 The report concerned those practices
14 See Great Britain, Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Reports on:
Supply of Dental Goods (1950), Supply of Cast Iron Rainwater Goods (1951), Supply of
Electric Lamps (1951), Supply of Insulated Electric Wires and Cables (1952), Supply of
Insulin (1952), Supply and Export of Matches and Supply of Match-Making Machinery
(1953), Supply of Imported Timber (1953), Process of Calico Printing (1954), Supply of
Buildings in the Greater London Area (1954), Supply and Export of Certain Semi-Manufactures of Copper and Copper-Based Alloys (1955), Supply and Export of Pneumatic
Tyres (1955), Supply of Sand and Gravel in Central Scotland (1956), Supply of Hard
Fibre Cordage (1956), Supply of Certain Rubber Footwear (1956), Supply of Linoleum
(1956), Supply of Certain Industrial and Medical Gases (1956), Supply of Electronic
Valves and Cathode Ray Tubes (1956), Supply of Tea (1956), Supply of Standard Metal
Windows and Doors (1956), Supply and Export of Electrical and Allied Machinery and
Plant (1956).
15 For a detailed analysis of the first nine reports, see Grunfeld & Yamey, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 377-84; for surveys of all twenty reports, see GUENAULT & JACKSON, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 65-134; Jewkes, British Monopoly Policy 1944-1956, I J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1958). See Cohen, The Reports of the Commission on Monopolies and Restrictive Practices, 63 EcoN. J. 196 (1953); Guenault &: Jackson, British Monopoly Legislation in Practice, 20 CAN. J. EcoN. &: PoL. Ser. 195 (1954); Howard, British Monopoly Policy: A. Current Analysis, 62 J. PoL. EcoN. 296 (1954); Hunter, The Monopolies Commission and
Economic Welfare, 23 l\fANCHESTER SCHOOL 22 (1955); Hunter, The Monopolies Commission and Price Fixing, 66 EcoN. J. 587 (1956); Kilroy, The Task and Methods of the
Monopolies Commission, 22 MANCHESTER SCHOOL 37 (1954).
16 Great Britain, Monopolies Commission, Imported Timber: Report on Whether and
to What Extent the Recommendation of the Commission Has Been Complied With (1958).
17 This order is reprinted in WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL, & ELLES, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 614-16.
18 Great Britain, Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Collective Discrimination -A Report on Exclusive Dealing, Collective Boycotts, Aggregated Rebates and
Other Discriminatory Trade Practices, C11m. No. 9504 (1955). See Yamey, The First
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found most often in the individual industry reports and recommended by the Commission to be against the public interest. They
included collective agreements to engage in exclusive dealing or
buying, collective action to maintain or enforce resale prices, and
aggregated rebates. A majority of seven of the ten members concluded that all of these practices were against the public interest.
Exempting four exceptional situations, the majority recommended
that these practices should be prohibited by legislation creating a
new criminal offense. The minority did not favor general prohibition. Instead, they recommended continuance of the case-by-case
investigation and drafting of remedies.

C.

Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956

The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 has three major
parts, only the first of which will be treated in this section.19 The
act adopts the minority view of the Monopolies Commission in
the Collective Discrimination report in that it does not make the
listed trade practices crimes, but rather provides for registration of
all such agreements and prohibition of those found contrary to the
public interest. It provides for judicial review, which the business
community prefers to the previous administrative investigation.
The 1956 Act thus continues the "pragmatic," case-by-case approach of the 1948 Act in contrast to the "dogmatic" method of
criminal condemnation of all unreasonable restraints of trade
found in the Sherman Antitrust Act.20
The 1956 Act creates one administrative office and one new
court. The Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, appointed by the Crown, is charged with compiling and maintaining
General Report of the Monopolies Commission, 19 MODERN L. REv. 63 (1956); Hunter,
The Progress of Monopoly Legislation in Britain: A Commentary, 2 Scornsa J. PoL. EcoN.
198 (1955); Jewkes, supra note 15, at 4-5; GUENAULT & JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 12, at
150-62.
19 Part II, which prohibits and makes unlawful all collective arrangements to enforce
resale price maintenance by boycott or discriminatory terms, is discussed infra under the
heading "Resale Price Maintenance." Part ill curtails the scope of investigations to be
undertaken by the Monopolies Commission, since review of restrictive agreements is taken
over by the Restrictive Practices Court. Part III will not be treated in this article.
Treatises published on the 1956 Act are Wilberforce, Campbell & Elles, op. cit. supra note
3; liEATHCOTE•VVll.LIAMS, ROBERTS AND BERNSTEIN, THE LAW OF REsmICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES (1956); ALBERY AND Fu:rCHER-COOKE, MONOPOLIES AND R.EsmlCTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES (1956); MARTIN, R.EsmlCTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES (1957).
See Keyes, Antitrust at Last in Britain: The Restrictive Practices Act of 1956, 25 G1::o,
WASH. L. REv. 627 (1957); Grunfeld, Antitrust Law in Britain Since the Act of 1956, 6
AM. J. COMP. L. 439 (1957).
20 Kaysen, Anti-Monopoly Policy in Britain and the United States, WESTMINSTER BANK
REvIEW, August 1956, 5, 8.
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a register of agreements which persons and firms are required to
file under the act. He also has the duty to initiate proceedings
before the Restrictive Practices Court to test the validity of registered agreements. The Restrictive Practices Court consists of
five judges of high court standing, to be nominated from existing
courts, and ten lay members, appointed on recommendation of
the Lord Chancellor by virtue of their "knowledge of or experience
in industry, commerce or public affairs." 21
Section 6 (1) requires registration of agreements in the United
Kingdom containing restrictions in respect to prices, terms or
conditions, quantities or descriptions of goods, process of manufacture, or persons or areas to be supplied.22 Under section 6,
"agreement" is to have a comprehensive meaning under the act,
and will include any arrangement between parties to accept the
listed restrictions, whether it is intended that such agreement will
be enforceable by legal proceedings or not.23 Furthermore, recommendations by trade associations to members to accept one of
the listed restrictions in most cases will be held an agreement by
a conclusive statutory presumption that trade association constitutions contain such undertakings.
Under section 20 of the act, the power to declare an agreement
to be contrary to the public interest and hence void is put in the
Restrictive Practices Court. The court has a further power, upon
application of the Registrar, to issue a restraining order to insure
dissolution of agreements.
21 A proceeding under the act must be heard by a panel of at least three with one
of the nominated judges presiding. The opinion of the judge or judges sitting prevails
on questions of law. A vote of the majority of all members prevails on questions of fact.
22 Section 6 (1) requires the registration of agreements under which two or more
persons carrying on business within the United Kingdom accept restrictions in respect of
one or more of the following:
"(a) the prices to be charged, quoted or paid for goods supplied, offered or acquired,
or for the application of any process of manufacture to goods;
'" (b) the terms or conditions on or subject to which goods are to be supplied or
acquired or any such process is to be applied to goods;
"(c) the quantities or descriptions of goods to be produced, supplied or acquired;
"(d) the processes of manufacture to be applied to any goods, or the quantities or
descriptions of goods to which any such process is to be applied; or
"(e) the persons or classes of persons to, for or from whom, or the areas or places in
or from which, goods are to be supplied or acquired, or any such process applied." 4 &: 5
Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 6 (1).
23 Sections 7 and 8 exempt certain classes of agreements from the registration requirement of § 6. Among these are agreements regulated by the Iron and Steel Act of 1953,
most bilateral agreements to supply or process goods, agreements to conform to standards
of the British Standards Institution, agreements for services, agreements regulated under
some other act, license agreements under patents or trade marks, and export agreements.
See Sieghart, The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956, 107 L.J. 115 (1957).
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Section 21 (1) of the act is probably the key section. Instead
of defining "public interest," section 21 establishes a presumption
that all registered restrictions are contrary to the public interest
unless one of seven listed defenses is proved by defendant (1) to
be substantial, and (2) to outweigh the public disadvantage of
the restriction.24
Whether one of these defenses exists is a question of fact to be
decided by the whole court or panel hearing the case. Whether it
is substantial is a question of law to be decided by the nominated
judges on the panel hearing the case. If the defense is found to
be substantial, the weighing of the defense against public detriment from the restriction is again a question of fact to be decided
by the whole court or panel. To a large extent this involves the
estimation of unmeasurable economic forces and the weighing of
interests that are not comparable. It is suggested that resort to some
24 The seven defenses or "gateways" in § 21 (1) which may be urged and proved to
justify a restriction are as follows:
" (a) that the restriction is reasonably necessary, having regard to the character of
the goods to which it applies, to protect the public against injury (whether to persons or
to premises) in connection with the consumption, installation or use of those goods;
"(b) that the removal of the restriction would deny to the public as purchasers, consumers or users of any goods other specific and substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed
or likely to be enjoyed by them as such, whether by virtue of the restriction itself or of
any arrangements or operations resulting therefrom;
"(c) that the restriction is reasonably necessary to counteract measures taken by any
one person not party to the agreement with a view to preventing or restricting competition
in or in relation to the trade or business in which the persons party thereto are engaged;
" (d) that the restriction is reasonably necessary to enable the persons party to the
agreement to negotiate fair terms for the supply of goods to, or the acquisition of goods
from, any one person not party thereto who controls a preponderant part of the trade
or business of acquiring or supplying such goods, or for the supply of goods to any person
not party to the agreement and not carrying on such a trade or business who, either alone
or in combination with any other such person, controls a preponderant part of the market
for such goods;
"(e) that, having regard to the conditions actually obtaining or reasonably foreseen
at the time of the application, the removal of the restriction would be likely to have a
serious and persistent adverse effect on the general level of unemployment in an area, or
in areas taken together, in which a substantial proportion of the trade or industry to
which the agreement relates is situated;
" (f) that, having regard to the conditions actually obtaining or reasonably foreseen
at the time of the application, the removal of the restriction would be likely to cause a
reduction in the volume or earnings of the export business which is substantial either in
relation to the whole export business of the United Kingdom or in relation to the whole
business (including export business) of the said trade or industry; or
" (g) that the restriction is reasonably required for purposes connected with the
maintenance of any other restriction accepted by the parties, whether under the same
agreement or under any other agreement between them, being a restriction which is
found by the Court not to be contrary to the public interest upon grounds other than those
specified in this paragraph, or has been so found in previous proceedings before the Court."
4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 21 (I).
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kind of economic "theory" is inevitable. 25 This could give the
court some fairly consistent framework from which to estimate the
effects of specific trade practices. It cannot solve the problem of
weighing the conflicting interests to reach a decision. Furthermore, the same restrictive practice or defense may arise in two
industries but occur with more impact in one and be given more
weight by the court in its decision. A consistent body of law is
thus unlikely to arise from the decisions, as will be seen below.

D. Progress Under the 1956 Act
The Register contained 2240 agreements at the end of 1959,
three years after its institution.26 The large majority of restrictive
agreements had been registered, so that further additions to the
register of agreements were expected in much smaller numbers.
They covered almost every manufacturing industry in the United
Kingdom and a large sector of wholesaling and retailing.
Only a small proportion of the registered agreements were
expected to be litigated. Many were in the same industries and
were almost identical except for geographic coverage. In the building industry, for example, 235 agreements were registered. Almost
all of these adopted the National Schedules of Daywork Charges
for General Building Work, which designated fixed percentages
to be added to labor cost, material cost and other direct charges
in bidding on construction projects.27 It also recommended rates
for hire of building equipment and machinery and haulage rates.
The next largest group was 210 agreements relating to consumer
goods. These were agreements between local consumer cooperatives not to enroll members or build shops in each other's terri25 Grunfeld &: Yamey, Restrictive Practices Act, 1956, [1956] PUBLIC LAW 313, 317-18.
For an analysis of the seven possible defenses in light of the findings of the earlier Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission reports, see Heath, The 1956 Restrictive
Trade Practices Act: Price Agreements and the Public Interest, 27 MANCHESTER SCHOOL 72
(1959).
26 Office of the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, Press Notice, January
21, 1960. A speech of R. L. Sich, Registrar, before British Association for the Advancement
of Science on September 3, 1959 is published as: Progress Under the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act, 1956, 177 BOARD OF TRADE J. 367 (1959), 11 YORI{SHIRE BULL. 116 (1959).
27 Registered Agreement No. 274, Birmingham Association of Building Trades Employers. See Stone and Reiners, Organization and Efficiency of the House-Building Industry
in England and Wales, 2 J. INDUS. EcoN. 118 (1954); Carter, The Building Industry, in 1
BURN (ed.), STRUCTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 47 (1958).
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tories. 28 There were also large groups of agreements in other single
ind us tries. 29
An official survey of the registered agreements was published in
1961.30 About two-thirds of the agreements concerned selling
prices, but of the 970 important agreements of nationwide application, 790 contained selling price restrictions. Limitations on
persons with whom parties would deal (exclusive dealing) were
accepted in about 300 agreements. Division of territories was the
subject of about 300 agreements also, while about 200 agreements
limited the types of goods the parties would produce. In most of
the industries enforcement of restrictions is vested in a trade association which is able to organize boycotts to patrol adherence.
In the first three years of the act, proceedings had been formally
instituted by the Registrar in regard to 85 agreements. The Board
of Trade selected the first groups of agreements to be referred to
the court on at least two bases. First, restrictive practices in a
number of key industries, such as automobiles, tires, paper, and
the distribution of newspapers had been the subject of much public complaint.31 Others had been the subject of Monopolies Commission reports where damaging restrictive practices were uncovered. Second, the cases were chosen in order to bring before the
court an array of restrictions under each of the five types listed in
section 6 (I) of the act.
The effects of the act and of the early decisions have been
·widespread. By the end of 1959, over 730 agreements had been
voluntarily abandoned. Of the 600 abandoned by August 1959,
28 A case testing the legality of the agreements by consumer cooperatives not to
solicit members or open shops in each other's territories was decided after this manuscript
was completed. These agreements for division of territories were held contrary to the
public interest under § 21 (I) (b) of the 1956 Act as not being of public benefit. In re
Doncaster and Retford Co-operative Societies' Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 105, [1960] 1 W.L.R.
1186, [1960] 3 All E.R. 541. In the United States, agreements for division of territories
are illegal per se under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S 211 (1899); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
20 In the radio and cathode ray tubes industry, there were 175 agreements; gravel and
crushed stone, 96; bread, 75; bolts and nails, 70; lime and concrete building materials, 61;
paper and paperboard, 61; clay bricks and pipes, 60; newspapers, 53; flour, 47; railway
vehicles, 42; crude chemicals from coal, oil and gas, 35; timber preservatives, 34; insecticides, 33; sand, 32; beer and ale, 32. In the various branches of the iron and steel industry, there were 199 registered agreements. Registered agreements in the food industry
are analyzed in Cuthbert & Black, Restrictive Practices in the Food Trades, 8 J. INDUS.
ECON. 33-57 (1959).
30 Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, Report for the Period 7th August,
1956 to 31st December, 1959, C21m. No. 1273 (1961). See Heath, Freer Prices- What
Progress? The Banker, February 1960, I.
31 More Cases for the Court, EcoN021nsr 1061 (March 22, 1958).
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250 of them had received notice from the Registrar that he intended to refer them to the court and 350 had not yet received notice.32
Consent orders by the court terminated the contested restrictions
in 50 cases and nine cases were tried by the court. These are discussed in the following two sections.

E. Decisions of the Restrictive Practices Court
The nine decisions of the Restrictive Practices Court are summarized in Table I. Price-fixing restrictions were the primary
issue in eight of the nine agreements. Agreed margins or discounts
appeared in three cases. Exclusive selling or boycotts were litigated
in two cases. Quality restrictions and allocation of customers were
each a subject of one of the cases.
Not all of the seven possible defenses listed in note 24 above
have been litigated. Defense (b), specific and substantial public
benefit from the restriction, has been urged in all nine cases. Defense (f), likely reduction in volume or earnings of export business, has been litigated in two cases. Defense (a), prevent public
injury; defense (d), enable negotiation of fair terms with a monopolist; and defense (e), prevent persistent adverse effect on employment, were each argued in one case. A defense was proved to be
substantial in four of the cases. In one of these, the proved defense
was found to be outweighed by the detriments to the public of
the restriction. In the other three, the proved defenses were held
to outweigh the detriments of the restrictions and therefore to be
not contrary to the public interest. The decisions in the cases will
be discussed under the specific defenses which have been litigated.

Defense (a): Prevent Public Injury. This defense was at issue
only in the first case, that of the Chemists' Federation, involving
horizontal and vertical exclusive dealing agreements.33 The function of the Federation was to prevent the retailing of patent medi32 Sich, supra note 26.
ss1n re Chemists' Federation Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 75 (1958). The federation included about two-thirds of the retail chemists (registered pharmacists), an unstated proportion of drug wholesalers and 122 out of 356 manufacturers of patent medicines. About
4000 out of a total of 9000 patent medicines were on the Chemists' Federation approved
list and sales of these constituted about one-third of total sales of patent medicines.
Manufacturer members agreed to sell their products only to wholesaler members or to
registered pharmacists. Wholesaler members agreed to sell only to registered pharmacists.
See Note, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1581 (1959).
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cines by persons or firms other than registered pharmacists.34
Under defense (a), the Federation argued that the restriction prevented injury to the public in that only a registered pharmacist
could advise customers on possible harm from taking incorrect
drugs or incorrect dosages. As to the estimated three-quarters of
patent medicines not covered by special legislation requiring dispensing by pharmacists, the finding was that the vast majority sold
in pharmacists' shops were sold by unqualified assistants without
any inquiry being made. Furthermore, the half of all patent medicines not covered by the Chemists' Federation Agreement were
sold in other stores by unqualified persons, and defendants showed
not one concrete case of injury. Since this defense was not proved
and neither was defense (b), discussed below, the Chemists' Federation agreement was held contrary to the public interest and
thus void. 35 Subsequently the Chemists' Federation was dissolved. 36

Defense (b ): Specific and Substantial Public Benefit. In the
Chemists' Federation case, defense (b) was urged primarily in
connection with the examining and testing of drugs by the standards committee of the Federation to see if they conformed to advertised claims. The court found that another trade association
of manufacturers performed this same function, so that no public
benefit would be lost if the Chemists' Federation ceased. Also as
to defense (b) the Federation urged that its exclusive dealing restriction kept in business a number of chemists in country districts
who would be forced out of business if the restriction ended, denying the public their entire services. The court found the evidence
of this too nebulous to support the conclusion. Data on the low
incomes of rural pharmacists did not alone indicate the effect on
incomes of removing the restrictions. For these reasons, the defense
was held not to be proved.
34 The extensive system of resale price maintenance in the industry was enforced by
stop lists through another, separate trade association, the Proprietary Articles Trade
Association. Thomas, The Pharmaceutical Industry, in 2 BURN (ed.), THE SmucruRE OF
BRITISH INDUSTRY 331, 359, 366 (1958).
35 In the United States under § 1 of the Sherman Act [26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.
§ I (1958)], horizontal agreements in the form of group boycotts or concerted refusals by
traders to deal with other traders, are illegal per se. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959). See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
465 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914). As a remedy under the Sherman Act, injunctive decrees containing compulsoryselling provisions have been entered in a number of cases. See table in Mund, Refusal To
Sell, II VAND. L. REv. 339, 354 (1958). See also Mund, The Right To Buy, S. Doc. No.
32, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
36 Chemists Wind Up, EcoNOMIST ll04 (December 20, 1958).
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An analogous boycott situation, alleged a public benefit, was
held unproved in the Carpet Manufacturers' case.37 The arbitrary
admission of firms to the approved wholesalers' list was held not to
be a benefit to the public, but a harm. The exclusion of genuine
wholesalers from the list had deprived the public and local retailers
of adequate retail service. Likewise, no justification was made for
the restriction on sales directly to consumers and the court held
this plainly bad. Nor was it shown that joint advertising arrangements were in any way dependent on the boycott restrictions and
hence the court found that such advertising could continue without
them.
Price-fixing restrictions were argued as benefits to the public
under defense (b) in a number of different aspects. Price stabilization was the most frequently argued benefit from price fixing,
being pleaded in five cases. The first of these cases was that of the
Cotton Yarn Spinners' Agreement.38 The court held that price
stabilization would not benefit the purchasing public since it could
be had only at the loss of a free competitive market.39 The court
37 In re Federation of British Carpet Manufacturers' Agreements, L.R. 1 R.P. 472
(1959), [1960] I All E.R. 356. The primary defendant, the Federation of British Carpet
Manufacturers, included 58 of the 72 producers in the United Kingdom. These members
made about 75% of the total United Kingdom production of all wool or worsted mixture
carpets. The Wholesale Floor Covering Distributors' Association were also made defendants.
The defendant members of the Manufacturers' Federation adopted restrictions in the
form of fixed prices for two qualities of Axminster and Wilton carpets, known as A·l and
W-1, and a fixed wholesalers' discount of 11 to 12½% from the fixed prices. The manufacturers sold only to wholesalers on an approved list, and agreed not to give quantity
discounts or to make direct sales to consumers, regardless of size of purchase. The price
fixing limited competition on the manufacturer and on the wholesaler levels. The agreed
discount to wholesalers prevented them from exercising their local monopoly power in
bargaining for carpets with the manufacturers. In exchange, the Federation's approved
list of wholesalers (193 in 1959) appeared to limit entry of new firms and protected
established wholesalers from greater competition. In order to secure the wholesalers'
distribution services, manufacturers also agreed to the restriction on their selling directly
to consumers.
38Jn re Yarn Spinners' Agreement, L.R. I R.P. 118, 188-89 (1959), [1959] I W.L.R.
154, [1959] I All E.R. 299. See analysis of trial in Sutherland, The Restrictive Practices
Court and Cotton Spinning, 8 J. INDUS. EcoN. 58 (1959); Davis, The Yarn Spinners'
Agreement, 109 L.J. 134 (1959). This association included the bulk of the firms manufacturing cotton into thread in the Lancashire cotton industry. The price-fixing scheme in
this declining industry involved an agreement not to sell below minimum prices calculated by the association on the basis of average cost data.
39 In the United States under § I of the Sherman Act, price-fixing agreements are
illegal per se. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395-401 (1927);
United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175
U.S. 211, 235 (1899). The defense of price stabilization to prevent "competitive abuses"
and establish "fairer competitive prices" was rejected under the Sherman Act in United
S!ates v. So~ony-yacuum ?il Co., ~10 U.S: 150, 221 (1940), as follows: "Ruinous competition, fin~ncra~ d1~aste~, evils of !'.nee c:uttmg and the like appear throughout our history
as ostensible JUStilications for pnce-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were to be
appraised here, the reasonableness of prices would necessarily become an issue in every
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found, however, that price stabilization, in terms of preventing
troughs and peaks, was a specific benefit to weavers and doublers.
But it found the benefit to this small segment of the public was
outweighed by the detriment of the general purchasing public in
losing a free market.
The view that price stabilization is not a benefit to the consuming public was reiterated in the Scottish Bakers' cases.40 The evidence failed to support the allegation that stable prices for standard
bread enabled lower production costs. The court found that stable
prices for standard bread were likely to result from the structure
of the industry itself and the evidence did not show that the agreed
price created greater stability. Furthermore, the costing methods
and the discretion in the costing committee allowed recommendations that did not necessarily accomplish lowest economic prices.
The system prevented the efficiencies of the lowest cost producers
from being passed on to the public in the form of lower prices.
A similar rejection of price stabilization as a public benefit
occurred in British & Irish Bakers' case.41 The maximum prices
recommended by the association were found to operate as fixed
prices.42 Since the members were warned against price cutting,
the court found that the recommended price would continue to
so operate. The court found that the recommended prices had not
in fact kept bread prices below what they would have been in a
free market. The cost-determined price formula was based on discredited sampling methods and resulted in profits too high to justify a claim that the formula adequately protected the consumer.
price-fixing case. In that event the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy
would be supplanted by one which is wholly alien to a system of free competition; it would
not be the charter of freedom which its framers intended." Judge Yankwich has stated:
"Economic benefits do not excuse price fixing in interstate commerce." United States v.
Food & Grocery Bureau of So. Cal., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 966, 972 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
40 In re 'Wholesale and Retail Bakers of Scotland Association's Agreement and In re
Scottish Association of Master Bakers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 347 (1959, [1959] 3 All
E.R. 98. The Scottish Association of Master Bakers had 1221 members. The Wholesale
and Retail Bakers of Scotland, an association of large producers or "plant bakers," had
23 members. These associations made price recommendations to their members, based
on cost investigations, for standard bread. This bread constituted 30% of total bakery sales.
41 In re Federation of Wholesale and Multiple Bakers' (Great Britain and Northern
Ireland) Agreement, L.R. l R.P. 387 (1959), (1960] 1 W.L.R. 393, [1960] I All E.R. 227.
The respondent Federation, founded in 1942, had 193 members in 1959. All of these were
plant bakers, using the modem mechanized method of the traveling oven. Their share of
total bread production in England and Wales in 1958-1959 was 51%. Standard bread, the
only t}pe for which the Federation recommended prices, constituted 56.9% of the value of
output of all bakeries.
42 In tl1e United States under § I of the Sherman Act, a horizontal agreement which
fixes only ma.ximum prices, like all other horizontal price-fixing agreements, is illegal per
se. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, 340 U.S. 21I (1951).
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The court found that long-run declining demand and the market
rivalry of plant bakers should lead to price reductions which the
agreed restriction would prevent.
In the Carpet Manufacturers' 43 and Phenol Producers'44 ( carbolic acid) cases price stabilization was also found of no public
benefit. The carpet pricing was allegedly based on cost while the
phenol agreed prices were not. 45
With these five clear precedents that price stabilization was not
of public benefit and therefore not a defense for price fixing, the
court did an about-face and upheld the defense of price stabilization in the Black Bolt & Nut producers' case.46 The specific and
substantial benefit to wholesalers and larger industrial users, purchasers of two-thirds of bolts and nuts sold domestically, was that
they would not have to "go shopping" for the lowest prices, but
could order from any single manufacturer and get the same price.
It was found that the remaining buyers would suffer no appreciable disadvantage or detriment. Likewise, it was found that the
public as consumers of products using black bolts and nuts would
not suffer a detriment by the loss of free market price determina43 In the Carpet case (L.R. 1 R.P. 472, 540), price stabilization was held, under similar
circumstances, not to benefit the public. The prices fixed for A-1 and W-1 carpets (which
were the only ones fixed) were arbitrary and not based on any generally accepted accounting procedures. Evidence showed a substantial range of costs among producers, and the
costing system, based on no more than informed guesses, could not assure that prices were
reasonable in the interest of the public. As to stability of prices, the court found it to
confer no benefit on the public in this case. The court held that ending the price fixing
would not create undue price instability, but could lead to increased competition that
would benefit the public. See note 36 supra.
44[n re Phenol Producers' Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 1 (1960), [1960] I W.L.R. 464,
[1960] 2 All E.R. 128. The estimated United Kingdom production of phenol for 1960 is
54,000 tons, of which about 16,000 tons will be natural phenol and 39,000 tons synthetic
phenol. The 14 members of respondent Association produced a substantial part of the natural phenol and about one-third of the synthetic phenol. Sales of synthetic phenol by nonmembers to large buyers were made at prices below the Association price, as were the
sales by all firms in the export market. Price stabilization was also rejected as not a
public benefit in a case decided after this manuscript was written. In re British Bottle
Association's Agreement, Times (London), March 25, 1961, 12.
45 The court rejected the argument that phenol price stabilization in times of excess
short-run demand operated as a price ceiling. Citing the Scottish Bakers' and Yam Spinners' cases, the court held that stabilization of price by itself had not been proved an
advantage to the public. Furthermore, the finding of fact in this case of excessively high,
rigid prices, bearing no relation to cost, could not be justified. They were clearly monopoly
prices. Rather than benefit the public, they were detrimental.
46 In re Black Bolt &:: Nut Association's Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 50, [1960] I W.L.R.
884, [1960] 3 All E.R. 122. The association had 44 members who produced about 90% of
the black bolts and nuts, carriage bolts and nuts, and railway fastenings in the United
Kingdom.
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tion because the agreed prices "have in fact been unreasonable. " 47
For the first time the court made a finding that a restrictive agreement resulted not only in reasonable prices, but what it also felt
to be reasonable profits. Hence, the price fixing was held not
contrary to the public interest.
Price fixing was also urged as a benefit under defense (b) because it allegedly kept less efficient firms from failing and thereby
maintained needed capacity in the particular industries. In Cotton
Yarn Spinners', a declining industry, the court rejected this defense. It found the demand variance only plus or minus IO percent
from average and was unconvinced that exceptional measures like
price fixing were necessary to create and maintain reserve capacity.
The court also ruled that the large excess capacity did not have to
be maintained for national emergencies. In Water-Tube Boilermakers,48 a long-run expanding industry, the court also rejected
this defense. Even though it felt that preservation of capacity was
important in this industry, the court held that defendants had
failed to prove that price fixing would support this purpose. It
found all six members financially able to survive a recession and
retain vital personnel. The Phenol Producers' case was the third
and most recent case where the need for excess capacity argument
was pleaded and rejected. The defendants argued that the then
47 [1960] I W.L.R. 884, 908. It should be noted that minimum price fixing in sales
to government was found not to be of specific and substantial benefit to it or any other
sector of the public and was therefore held contrary to the public interest.
The rule in this case was strictly construed as applying only to bolts and nuts in the
next subsequent case, in which price fixing was unsuccessfully defended as necessary to
finance selling in rural areas and to save customers the trouble of shopping for confectionaries. In re Wholesale Confectioners Alliance's Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 135, [1960] I
W.L.R. 1417; injunction issued, [1961] 2 All E.R. 8. In the following case, however, an
industry-wide agreement for multiple basing-point pricing of cement was held not contrary
to the public interest as a public benefit under defense (b). The court felt that the cartel
pricing resulted in lower prices to customers far from plants which it held to outweigh
the detriment of higher prices to customers near plants, citing the Black Bolt and Nut
case as authority. In re The Cement Makers' Federation's Agreement, [1961] 2 All E.R. 75.
These two cases were decided after this manuscript was written.
48Jn re Water-Tube Boilermakers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 285 (1959), [1959] 3 All
E.R. 257. The respondents, six of the nine United Kingdom manufacturers, belonged to
the ·water-Tube Boilermakers' Association. For the years 1952 to 1958 inclusive, these six
firms' sales comprised 79% of all boilermaker sales by United Kingdom firms. Under the
agreement, each member reported every inquiry or request to bid to the Association. If
more than one received an inquiry or request to bid on the same project, the director of
the Association called a meeting to which these firms all brought their tentative offers.
They then selected one firm that was allowed to lower its offer to be equal with the
lowest tentative offer presented at the meeting. This firm was usually able to secure the
contract. The agreement also provides for preferential interfirm buying of specialized
products.
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present excess of supply over demand that made the world freemarket price for phenol below the United Kingdom domestic
price was only short-run, since there was a rising long-run industrial demand for phenol. It argued further that ending the pricefixing would cause the phenol price to drop 25 percent and that
this would cause an estimated 50 percent of the tar used in distilling natural phenol to be diverted to fuel uses within three or four
years, thus sharply curtailing the output of by-products derived
solely from producing natural phenol. The court rejected this
defense. It suggested lower prices can generate new uses and new
demand. It further pointed to the elementary economic fact that
there will be no excess supply in a free market because price will
equate supply and demand. Furthermore, it asserted that the
continued construction of synthetic phenol plants would be likely
to anticipate the growing long-run demand, and hence there would
be no shortage of supply in future years.
Price fixing was further urged as a benefit under defense (b)
because it allegedly prevented debasement in quality of product.
This argument was rejected by the court in all of the five cases in
which it was urged. In Cotton Yarn Spinners', defendants alleged
that price fixing channeled competition into product rivalry which
maintained and improved quality. The court found no logical
connection between the two, holding that both price and product
competition were desirable. Similar findings that competition in
all its aspects made for improved quality or that defendants had
failed to prove a causal connection between price fixing and preventing quality debasement were made in the Scottish Bakers',
Carpet Manufacturers', and Black Bolt & Nut Producers' cases.
In the Blanket Manufacturers' case the argument of preventing
debasement in quality was rejected because the price fixing applied
to such a small proportion of total output, and, since prices were
usually above the agreed minimum, the small likelihood of a recession severe enough to bring the scheme into operation.40
Price fixing was pleaded as a benefit under defense (b) in that
it enabled the defendants to engage in research and plant modernization. In the Cotton Yarn Spinners' case, the court considered
this argument to have some merit but then rejected it, holding that
49 In Te Blanket Manufacturers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 208 (1959), [1959] I W.L.R.
442, [1959] 2 All E.R. I. The twenty members of the association produced 70% of the
total United Kingdom output of white all wool raised blankets in 1957. This type blanket,
the only one subject to the minimum price agreement, was 15% of the total woven woolen
blankets produced by members. See Davis, The Blanket ManufactuTeTs' Association's
Agr-eement, 109 L.J. 279 (1959).
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the benefits of modernization attributable to price fixing were not
substantial. It found that the price-fixing scheme's main effect
here would be to delay price reductions that should result from
reduced costs in modernization. In the Blanket case, where the
price fixing on this small proportion of total blankets was rarely
operative, the court felt the modernization could be attributed to
price fixing only to a small extent. In the Water-Tube Boilermakers' case, the court found research costs to be such a small
proportion of overhead expenditures and a deep depression so
unlikely that it felt research would continue in spite of any future
recession. In the Black Bolt & Nut case, the court found that
cooperative research was not shown to be directly related to agreed
pricing so that the former was dependent on continuance of the
latter. Hence this ground for defense (b) was rejected in all four
cases.
Price fixing was also defended as a public benefit on the ground
that it prevented monopoly. In the Cotton Yarn Spinners' case
this was rejected because there was no evidence that the five largest
firms, then controlling 40 percent of output, would, on termination of price fixing, monopolize the industry. In the Scottish
Bakers' case, there was also no evidence that the technological
trend to fewer, large plant bakers would be in any way affected
by the end of price fixing.
Mark-up and discount restrictions were defended in three cases
as a public benefit under defense (b). The defense failed in all
three cases. In the British & Irish Bakers' case, the recommended
fixed retailers' margin was found to introduce an element of rigidity in the price structure that would hinder sales to independent
retailers at reduced prices. In the Carpets case, the abrogation of
the fixed wholesale discount, even if it led to greater discounts or
quantity discounts, was found not to deny the public substantial
benefits. The court held there was no ground for believing that
increased discount from manufacturers to wholesalers would either
increase the price of carpets to the general public or decrease the
range of carpets available. In the Black Bolt & Nut case, a quantity
discount based on aggregate purchases from all members of the
association was held not to benefit the public as purchasers. It
was found not to have the economic justification of a large-order
discount. The court did not find it necessary to mention the
possible detriment to the competition of non-members of the
association.
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The Blanket Manufacturers' case was the other of the two
cases where defense (b) was proved and held not contrary to the
public interest.50 The first supplementary part of the Blankets
agreement, not to make woolen raised blankets below a certain
minimum weight, was upheld as conferring specific and substantial benefits or advantages on the public. Respondents showed that
blankets weighing less than the specified minimum were thin, flimsy
and weak and that these defects were unlikely to be discovered by
the housewife on inspection of a new blanket. The benefit to the
public was held to outweigh the detriment of this agreement that
prevented product competition of thin blankets.151
The rest of the supplementary agreements in the Blankets case,
concerning terms of trade and packaging, except one, were found
not to confer substantial benefits on the public and were, like the
price fixing, held contrary to the public interest. The one agreement which the court held not even to be a restriction under section 6 (I) was that "No manufacturer shall agree to the breaking
of any contract by reduction in price." Contracts were to be canceled or varied only with consent of a committee of the trade association. The Registrar acceded to the view that this was not a restriction. The Court of Appeal upheld the Restrictive Practices
Court ruling to this effect.152

Defense (d): Enable Negotiation of Fair Terms With a Monopolist. Defense (d) was pleaded in the Water-Tube Boiler50 The successful defense under § 21 (I) (b) in the price fixing of Black Bolts and Nuts
was described first but occurred later in time.
51 In the United States under § 1 of the Sherman Act, concerted agreements to
standardize products and refrain from the manufacture of some types have been held
illegal. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 91 (1950). In the cases,
concerted standardization has been held illegal as an adjunct to a price-fixing conspiracy.
C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). Trade association standardization activities not accompanied
by agreements to adhere to the proposed standards are presumptively legal. LAMB &:
Krrrnr.LE, TRADE AssoCIATION LAw AND PRACTICE 86 (1956).
52In re Blanket Manufacturers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 271 (C.A. 1959). See Ison,
Restrictive Trade Practices - The Danger Sign, 23 MODERN L. REv. 202 (1960), commenting
that a horizontal sanctity of contracts resolution which was used to reinforce price collusion might standing alone still impede contract revision that might be characteristic of
some competitive markets.
In the United States under § 1 of the Sherman Act, an agreement of trade association
members to adhere to their individually announced and reported prices is an illegal
price-fixing agreement. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 643-44 (1936).
See Donovan, The Effect of the Decision in the Sugar Institute Case Upon Trade Associa•
tion Activities, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 929 (1936); Fly, Observations on the Anti-trust Laws,
Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute Decisions, 45 YALE L.J. 1339 (1936); Fly, The
Sugar Institute Decisions and the Anti-trust Laws, 46 YALE L.J. 228 (1936). Agreements to
adhere to list prices also violate § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. §
45 (a)]. Advertising Specialty National Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1956).
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makers' case as a ground to justify a system of price fixing and
allocation of customers among the members. Respondents argued
that their agreement was reasonably necessary to negotiate fair
terms with a buyer controlling a preponderant part of the market
for such goods. The facts showed that during the years 1952 to
1958 inclusive the Central Electricity Generating Board placed 83
percent of domestic boiler orders, or 56 percent of domestic and
foreign orders, measured in money terms. The court accepted one
argument supporting this defense and rejected the other. Evidence
from the Electricity Board asserted that they did not desire to
force prices of boilers down to less than production costs. The
court found, however, that in this industry of only six large firms,
some were likely to make offers at uneconomic prices in the hope
of getting an occasional contract. It held that price rivalry which
might drive any of these large firms out of business would not be
in the national interest, thereby accepting the capacity preservation argument it had rejected under defense (b).53 On the other
hand, the court found the restriction was too wide, in that it covered not only Electricity Board offers but all boiler offers. On this
latter ground, it held that defense (d) had failed.
Defense (e): Prevent Serious and Persistent Unemployment.
This defense was pleaded only in the Cotton Yarn Spinners' case.
The Association urged that the more efficient organization of the
industry which would result from the end of price fixing would
increase and aggravate the persistent local unemployment in Lancashire.54 The court pointed out that the unemployment statistics
and estimates were incomplete and not reliably accurate. It found
that plants were closing in spite of (or partially because of) the
scheme as demand declined and, at most, ending the price fixing
would only accelerate closings.55 In conclusion on defense (e), the
court did find that ending price fixing would have an adverse
effect upon employment and that it would probably be persistent.
63See Yamey, Water-Tube Boilers: Contradictions and a Paradox, 23 MODERN L. REv.
79 (1960); Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 924 (1960). This defense was also unsuccessful in a
case in a related industry decided after this manuscript was written. In re Associated
Transformer Manufacturers' Agreement, Times (London), March 25, 1961, 12.
64 The court did not mention the possibility that lower, competitive prices might stimulate demand and thereby increase employment or at least reduce the drop in employment. See Yamey, The Yarn-Spinners' Agreement: Economics in Court, 22 MODERN L. REv.
416, 417n (1959).
65 See Furness, The Cotton and Rayon Textile Industry, in 2 BURN (ed.), THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 184, 203 and 217 (1958); Au.EN, BRITISH INDUSTRIES AND THEIR
ORGANIZATION 188, 211 (3d ed. 1951).
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The next task was to weigh the alleged benefits of price fixing
against its detriments.
The court found the detriments to the public from the scheme
to be threefold: (1) higher prices for cloth made from cotton yarn,
(2) loss or handicap of export trade, and (3) waste of national
resources caused by excess capacity. It had held that the arguments
under defense (b) benefited only a small class of trade purchasers
and thus did not offset the detriment to the public of this pricefixing scheme. It found defense (e), the resulting unemployment,
more significant, but held that the price fixing only postponed
reorganization of the industry to lower capacity. On balance, it
held the employment benefits of price fixing outweighed by its
detriments.

Defense (f): Likely Reduction in Volume or Earnings of Export
Business. The first of the two cases in which this defense was
pleaded was Water-Tube Boilermakers. Respondents argued that
removal of the restriction would reduce the volume and earnings
from export business, which was substantial in relation to the
whole business of the industry. About 40 percent of members'
sales were in the export market. This argument the court accepted
as a valid defense. It held that consultation among the members
on foreign offers enabled them to correct each other's errors in
making bids and enabled a preferred member to offer a foreign
customer the "keenest" possible price. It held further that the
restriction gave members that extra confidence which made it
worth while to keep expensive foreign establishments.
In the final balancing of the benefit from the protection to
export volume and earnings against the detriments to the public
of the restriction, the court held for respondents. It held that the
public here would be the purchasers of boilers and not the general public as electricity users. The court refused to consider the
misallocation of resources a detriment because of the argument
accepted under defense (d) that the few large orders should be
spread among the firms in order to keep them all in business. In
the court's opinion, the other major detriment, the higher prices
resulting from the restriction, were outweighed by the benefits of
protecting export volume and earnings.
This case demonstrates the potency of economic nationalism.56
Firms currently able to meet world competition convinced the
56 In the ·United States under the Webb-Pomerene Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1958)],
trade association price fixing which is confined solely to the export markets is exempt from
prosecution under the Sherman Act. See LAMB&: K.rr:rau.E, TRADE AssoCIATION LAW AND
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court that they had to act jointly to compete on the flimsy arguments that they would correct each other's errors in planning
offers and that they needed price restrictions domestically to have
confidence to maintain foreign offices. The first argument is probably untrue and the second is a non sequitur.
In the Carpets case, the defense relating to earnings in the
export trade was entirely rejected. Carpet exports as a whole were
in rapid decline and exports of type A-1 carpets were in greater
decline than all carpets together. Since British A-1 was shown to
be a quality standard in the Australian market, defendants argued
that end of the restrictions would lead to debasement of quality
and eventually hurt sales in Australia. This the court rejected.
It could see no reason why established manufacturers could not
continue their sales by maintaining their quality and bringing this
to the notice of the public. Finally the court noted that the Federation had adopted a policy in many export markets of removing
the restrictions. It found it difficult to see why freedom of action
in the home market should lead to a reduction of exports.57
F. Consent Orders Under the 1956 Act
Fifty consent orders terminating restrictive agreements which
had been referred to the Restrictive Practices Court by the Registrar were entered during the first four years of the act's operation.
Only two of these, both price-fixing agreements, were entered
before the filing of the opinion of Justice Devlin in the Yarn Spinners' case in January 1959. The other forty-eight were entered
following the general condemnation of price fixing in that opinion.
The facts of these consent orders are summarized in Table II infra.
Forty-two of the fifty agreements had overt price fixing as their
primary clause. In two others, Garage Equipment and Electric
PRACTICE 122-40 (1956). The Webb-Pomerene Act does not exempt domestic price fixing
from the Sherman Act, regardless of the impact this may allegedly have on exports or
export earnings.
57 Before trial of this case, respondents applied to the court to sever that portion of
their agreements relating to exports and thereby exclude them from consideration by
the court. Agreements relating solely to export trade must be registered with the Board
of Trade for possible consideration by the Monopolies Commission and not with the
registrar for review by the Restrictive Practices Court. The application in this case was
refused. In re Federation of British Carpet Manufacturers' Application, L.R. I R.P. 550
(1959), In the United States under § I of the Sherman Act, such a combined domestic
and export agreement to fix prices would also be illegal per se. United States v. U.S.
Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Only if the export agreement were
entirely separate and unrelated to the domestic market would it be exempt under the
Webb-Pomerene Act. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1958). The exports earnings defense was also
rejected by the Court in the Transformer case. See note 53 supra.
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Light Fittings, the firms agreed to adhere to their individually
announced prices until formal announcement of new prices. Five
others were supplementary agreements in industries covered by
price-fixing agreements. Thus, the only industry subject to a
consent order which did not have an industry-wide price agreement of some type was Radio and Cathode Ray Tubes. In two
industries, Electric Resistance Furnaces and Springs and Interior
Springing, agreements provided for additional price consultation
among members when a special order was to be produced. Delivered pricing was required of members in six agreements. These
were Agricultural Twines, Tuyere Makers, Zinc Oxide, Paving
and Kerb Manufacturers, Bath Manufacturers, and Hard Fibre
Rope.
Many of the agreements contained clauses to limit product
rivalry and thereby make it possible to police a system of price
agreements. Limitations on types of product, in some cases by
setting quality standards, were found in Flour Milling, Pneumatic
Tools, Air Compressors, Concrete Mixers, Plate Glass, Hard Fibre
Cord and Twine, Trawl Twine, Electric Light Fittings, and Hard
Fibre Rope. Limits on types of services or processes offered were
used in the Rubber Proofers' and Glass Benders' agreements.
Similar restrictions were in effect in Twist Drills, Building Bricks
and Galvanized Tanks. Other agreements provided that one firm
would not sell to a customer who was in arrears in paying another
seller (Building Bricks; Washed Sand and Gravel), that members
would divide territories (Washed Sand and Gravel; Paving and
Kerb Manufacturers), and that members would not supply parts to
fit machines of other members (Electric Resistance Furnaces;
Pneumatic Tools; Air Compressors).
Certain of the restrictions were of types that could have resulted
from customer pressure on the member firms. The agreements
among the Association members would tend to equalize their market positions in submitting to these pressures. Agreements to sell
only with resale price maintenance were made in Semirotary Wing
Pumps, Domestic Electric Cookers, Building Bricks, Concrete
Mixers, Hard Fibre Cord, Garage Equipment, Electric Light Fittings, Metal Bedsteads, and Hard Fibre Rope. Agreements to sell
only to buyers on a certified list were used in Radio Tubes, Flour
Millers, Building Bricks, Light Edge Tools, Agricultural Twine,
Concrete Mixers, Garage Equipment, Electric Light Fittings, and
Glycerine. To the extent that these lists were used to limit the
number of firms receiving distributors' discounts, but not prevent
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sales to others, they also benefited sellers. The Flour Millers'
scheme of deferred rebates for large buyers was probably induced
by the factors, who were the bulk purchasers. Likewise, the Plate
Glass agreement to sell only to members who made at least certain
minimum purchases was probably induced by the purchasing distributors as a barrier to entry.
Two legal points were established in the cases resulting in consent orders. In the Constructional Steelwork case58 it was held
that a price-fixing agreement that was terminated after reference
to the court but before hearing is still properly subject to a consent order. Only if a declaration that the agreement was contrary
to public interest was of record could the Registrar seek injunctions against renewed price-fixing schemes. In the British & Irish
Millers' case59 six respondents refused to be represented by the
trade association in the hearings and were not parties to the consent order. The court held that even though these parties did not
appear or defend their case, a declaration that the restrictions in
which they engaged were contrary to the public interest would be
entered together with an injunction restraining them from giving
effect to or enforcing the agreement.

G. Summary and Comparison With the United States
Only nine cases involving substantive controversies under the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act have been heard. In eight of the
nine cases (all except the Chemists' Federation), price fixing was
the primary purpose of the agreement. In only four cases, defenses were proved to exist and found legally substantial so that
they had to be balanced against the detriment resulting from the
agreement. In the Yarn Spinners' case, defense (b), specific benefit
to that segment of the public in the trade resulting from price
stabilization, and defense (e), that removal of the restriction (price
fixing) was likely to have a persistent adverse effect on employment
in the area, were both held substantial but were found to be outweighed by the detrimental effects of the higher prices. In the
Blanket Manufacturers' case, though the price fixing was not
proved to benefit the public, the minimum weight agreement for
raised wool blankets was held to benefit the public under defense
(b) and the benefits were found to outweigh the detriments of
58 In re British Constructional Steelwork Association's Agreement, L.R. I R.P. 199
(1959).
50 In re National Association of British and Irish Millers Ltd.'s Scheme, L.R. I R.P.
267 (1959), [1960] 1 W.L.R. 63.
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this agreement. In the Water-Tube Boilermakers' case, defense
(£), that removal of the restriction (price fixing and allocation of
customers' orders) would be likely to cause a reduction in the
volume of the export business, was held substantial and was found
to outweigh the detrimental effects of the agreements. In the Black
Bolt & Nut case, price fixing was found under defense (b) to benefit the public because the resulting price stabilization would enable
wholesalers and larger buyers to avoid "going shopping" for lowest
prices and this was held to outweigh any possible detriments to the
public from the agreements. Thus, in only three instances have
defenses been held to outweigh detriments, thereby upholding the
restrictions. Two of these cases were under defense (b) and one
under defense (f).
The Restrictive Trade Practices Act has operated as a much
more potent anti-monopoly weapon than most observers had predicted.60 The fact that over 700 agreements were abandoned by
January 1960 must be attributed to the sweeping language of the
court in condemning price-fixing restrictions in the Yarn Spinners'
case. 61 The basic construction of the statute must not be minimized. The act puts an initial burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove that one of the defenses in section 21 (1) is substantial. But this estimation or prediction of economic effects and
their magnitude always involves speculation.62 To the extent that
the court demands measurable and factual evidence to support the
defenses in section 21 (1), cases become more difficult and hence
less likely to result in a successful defense. The presumption that
the restrictions listed in section 6 are contrary to the public interest derives from the established theories of neoclassical economics.63 The courts' strong language in the first few cases rests directly on the economics of free markets. But the defenses upheld
in the Water-Tube Boilermakers' and Black Bolt & Nut cases show
the triumph of pragmatic factual reasoning over the welfare considerations of positive economics. The cases demonstrate the non60 Dennison, The Restrictive Trade Practices Court in Action, 11 YORKSHIRE BULL. 100,
102 (1959).

61 For an analysis of agreements abandoned by industry classes, see Heath, Freer Prices
- What Progress? THE BANKER, February 1960, 1.
62 Yamey, A New Court's First Judgment, 22 MODERN L. REv. 213 (1959).
63 For an analysis of the problem of breaching the gap between theory and practice,
see Symposium on Restrictive Practices Legislation, 'Wiseman, Economic Analysis and
Public Policy, 70 EcoN. J. 455 (1960). For economic analyses of some of the defenses, see
Dennison, The British Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 64, 71-75
(1959); Heath, Restrictive Practices Court on Competition and Price Restriction, 28 l\!ANCHESTER SCHOOL 1-18 (1960).
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legal nature of the weighing of benefits alleged by defendants to
derive from the agreements against the detriment to the public
presumed by the act and argued by the Registrar. The weighing
and balancing of unmeasurable and non-comparable economic
consequences of agreements is not a judicial task in the usual
meaning of law interpretation. 64 There is no reason to believe,
however, that an administrative commission of professional politicians would do a superior job.
The fifty consent orders under the Restrictive Trade Practices
Act further indicate the generalized force that the Yarn Spinners'
decision has had on price fixing. They, together with the large
number of price agreements that were abandoned, indicate the
large sector of the business community which is convinced that its
price agreements cannot be successfully defended. Agreements
limiting product rivalry or barring sales to uncertified buyers have
also been the subject of a number of consent orders. Other practices have not been brought before the court enough times to generalize on the likelihood of successful defenses.
The scope of the British Act is much narrower than that of
the United States antitrust laws. The 1956 statute is almost exclusively concerned with horizontal agreements between independent business firms. 611 Problems of monopoly are specifically
left by the 1956 Act in the hands of the Monopolies Commission. 66
This means that alleged monopolies are subject to investigation
only on reference from the Board of Trade and are not illegal, as
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 67 Mergers are not covered by
the 1956 Act, and if the two or more merging firms together do not
produce or process one-third of the products in their industry,
they are not subject to monopoly investigation either. 68 Contrast
this with the standard of section 7 of the Clayton Act, where
mergers are illegal if their effect may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly. 69
64 Symposium on Restrictive Practices Legislation, Lloyd, The Lawyers Point of View,
70 EcoN. J. 467, 471 (1960).
05 Intra-enterprise agreements are specifically exempted as follows: "interconnected
bodies corporate or individuals carrying on business in partnership with each other shall
be treated as a single person." 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 88, § § 6 (8) and 8 (9). In the United States,
intra-enterprise conspiracies may violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. See review of cases in
lli:PORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMJIU'ITEE

To

STUDY THE ANTITRUST

30-36 (1955).
co 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §§ 28-31 (1956).
01 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U .S.C. § 2 (1958).
68 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 66, §§ 3-5 (1948).
60 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C.

§

18 (1958).
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The British Act explicitly exempts from registration vertical
agreements between a single seller and a single buyer.70 This
section is reinforced by another which exempts exclusive dealing
arrangements and exclusive buying or representation agreements,
as long as the agreement has only two parties, a seller and a buyer.71
The breadth of the exemption on vertical agreements is illustrated
by the Austin Motor case.72 Prior to passage of the Restrictive
Practices Act, Austin entered annual, multiparty agreements with
distributors and dealers providing for resale price maintenance,
minimum annual purchases, minimum inventories of new cars,
limiting dealers' sales areas, and other minor limitations. In 1957
all the multilateral agreements were replaced by a series of bilateral
agreements designed to accomplish the same marketing scheme.
In an action to test whether these bilateral agreements were registrable, the Chancery Division of the High Court73 held that they
were not. This decision, rendered on the basis of the agreements
themselves, without collateral evidence, has been criticized as unduly limiting the scope of the act.74 In contrast to the British
statute, vertical agreements are not exempt from sections I or 2
of the Sherman Act.75 Exclusive dealing arrangements are illegal
under section 3 of the Clayton Act where the effects of such an
agreement may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.76
The five classes of horizontal agreements which must be registered under section 6 (I) of the British Act are delineated in
specific and detailed terms. The defenses under the British Act,
too, are stated in fairly specific terms in section 21 (1) of the act.
Exact guides for courts not only facilitate enforcement, but they
minimize the litigation over the breadth and scope of the principal
statutory terms. Contrast this with seventy years of litigation in
70 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 7 (2).
71 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 8 (3).
72 In re Austin Motor Co.'s Agreements, L.R. 1 R.P. 6 (Ch. D. 1957).
73 The High Court, rather than the Restrictive Practices Court, is

given jurisdiction
to decide whether or not an agreement is subject to registration under the Restrictive
Trade Practices Act. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 13 (2).
74 Grunfeld, The Restrictive Trade Practices Act in Court, 21 MODERN L. R.Ev. 83 (1958);
Wedderburn, Restrictive Trade Practices - Resale Price l\:Caintenance - Registration of
Agreements, [1957] CAMB. L.J. 121, 122.
75 As to close combinations, see Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The
Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 157 (1954). As to loose
combinations, see Kessler &: Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69
YALE L.J. 1 (1959).
76 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1958). See HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECllVE
29-48 (1957).
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the United States over the meaning and scope of "reasonable
restraint of trade" in section 1 of the Sherman Act. Under the
British act, however, great discretion is vested in the Restrictive
Practices Court in weighing the defenses in section 21 (1) against
the presumption of illegality. Defense (b), the broadest and most
ambiguous of the seven, was given great vitality by the Black Bolt
& Nut decision. If the court follows this view in later cases, defense
(b) will become at least as wide and uncertain as "unreasonable
restraint of trade" under the Sherman Act.
As to the five classes of horizontal agreements which are registrable under section 6 (I) of the British act and presumed contrary to the public interest, it can be argued that Parliament was
too cautious in refusing to declare them illegal.77 In the United
States, these classes of agreements have been held unreasonable per
se and therefore illegal under the Sherman Act.78 From an economic
point of view, the three registered agreements which were successfully defended are highly questionable. The agreement in the
Blankets case not to manufacture blankets below a certain weight
will probably channel non-members' production toward this product of questionable quality. Meanwhile, members ·will have less
motive to try to develop new, light-weight woolen blankets of
greater durability. In the Water-Tube Boilers' case, there was just
no valid, logical connection between domestic price-fixing and
greater export sales other than price discrimination in favor of
export markets. In the Black Bolt & Nut case, the court approved
the closure of the free market for the products because the immediate parties found price fixing more convenient.
The conclusive statutory presumption in section 6(7) of the
British act that recommendations by a trade association are pursuant to agreement of the members is a useful innovation.79 It
could go a long way toward reducing the power of British trade
associations. Trade associations in the United States refrain from
making recommendations for future price or output of members
because they are very likely to be held illegal.80
77 This was the view of the majority of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices in
the 1955 report on Collective Discrimination, supra note 18. See comments of Cairns,
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices, in GINSBERG (ed.), LAw AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN
nu: TWENTIETH CENTURY 173, 180 (1959).
78 See footnotes 35, 39, 42, 51, 52 and 57 supra.
79 The validity of this section was upheld in In re Federation of Wholesale and
Multiple Bakers' (Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Agreement, L.R. I R.P. 387, 455-57
(1959).
S0American Column&: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). See LAMB
&: KITl'ELI-E, TRADE AssoCIATION LAw AND PRACfICES 34-42, 64-70 (1956).
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The final and most difficult question is that of the effectiveness
of anti-monopoly law in creating industrial performance more
closely approximating competition.81 One-third of the registered
restrictive agreements in the United Kingdom have been abandoned. But, given the background of former industrial government by trade associations, these firms may hesitate to initiate
price rivalry.82 Price leadership is likely to become prevalent.83
Over longer periods of time, with new production and distribution methods, changing cost structures may foster increased price
rivalry and break down the older patterns of price stability. The
presumptive illegality of agreements to control inputs of production or market outlets may also stimulate the entry of new firms
and expansion of existing firms into new products. With exception of the merger loophole, British law has gone a long way toward
creating the legal environment of competition which is characteristic of the United States economy. It remains to be seen whether
the Restrictive Practices Court will adhere primarily to the economic principles of free markets or uphold the defenses in so many
instances that the presumptions of the act come to be doubted by
the business world.
II.

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

It was estimated in 1938 that approximately 30 percent of
domestic consumers' expenditures for goods in the United Kingdom were for items subject to resale price maintenance.84 In 1960,
a critic of resale price maintenance estimated that about 25 percent of personal consumer expenditures were for goods sold under
price maintenance,85 while a proponent of the practice estimated
this figure to be only 20 percent.86 The purpose of this discussion
81 See Keezer, The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust Laws: A Symposium, 39
AM. EcoN. REv. 689-724 (1949); Markham, The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust
Laws: Comment, 40 AM. EcoN. REV. 167 (1950); WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES (1958);
Miller, Comment, Impact of Antitrust, 12 VAND. L. R.Ev. 1047 (1959); CONANT, ANTITRUST
IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY (1960).
82 Beacham, The Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 11 YORKSHIRE BULL. 79 (1959).
83 Symposium on Restrictive Practices Legislation: Heath, Some Economic Consequences, 70 EcoN. J. 474 (1960).
84 Great Britain, Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance Cl\m. No. 7696 (1949) at 1, quoting National Institute of Social and Economic
Research.
85 YAMEY, REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND SHOPPERS' CHOICE 8 (1960).
86 ANDREWS & FRIDAY, FAm TRADE: REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE RE-EXAMINED 9 (1960).
Comparable figures for the United States estimated price-maintained goods in 1939 to be
about 5% of retail sales of goods with an upper estimate of 10%. GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL
UNDER FAm TRADE LEGISLATION 322 (1939). Herman estimates that the volume of goods
subject to resale price maintenance may have reached 10% of total retail dollar sales in
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is to explain the estimated decline. Primarily, this involves an
evaluation of the changes in the law and practice of resale price
maintenance following passage of the Restrictive Trade Practices
Act of 1956.87

A. Law and Practice Prior to 1956
Resale price maintenance in the United Kingdom originated
in the last two decades of the nineteenth century for such goods
as drugs, tobacco, stationery, leather goods, bicycles and some grocery and hardware items. 88 An early decision held resale price
maintenance agreements not to be in restraint of trade, and, if reasonable for the parties, enforceable between them.89 Resale price
agreements could not be enforced, however, where plaintiff was
not a party to the particular contract. A tire manufacturer thus
was not allowed to enforce a resale price contract made at his direction between his distributor and a retailer on the ground that
there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant.90
But if goods were patented, resale price maintenance could be
enforced, by virtue of the statutory patent monopoly, against persons not parties to resale price contracts.91
Enforcement of resale price maintenance by breach of contract
actions proved infeasible for the bulk of goods which moved
through one or more middlemen before reaching the retailers.
The middleman who sold to the price-cutting retailer, the only
seller in privity of contract with him, usually had no interest in
such enforcement and would not report the facts of violations.
Furthermore, the assembly of sufficient evidence for legal proof
1950 but in 1954 was 6.9%. Herman, A Statistical Note on Fair Trade, 4 ANTITRUST Buu..
583, 587 (1959). The percentage is substantially less in 1961.
87 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68 (1956).
88 YAMEY, ECONOMICS OF REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 133-57 (1954).
so Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Sons, Ltd., [1901] 2 Ch. 275; Palmolive Co. (of
England) v. Freedman, [1928] Ch. 264. For detailed surveys of the law of resale price maintenance, see Doc, THE LAW RELATING TO COMMITTEE TRADING II0-26 (1938); HEDGES,
LAW RELATING TO RE5TRAINT OF TRADE 60-63 (1932).
In the United States, early state court decisions divided on whether resale price
maintenance contracts were in unreasonable restraint of trade. See annotations: 7 A.L.R.
449, 460 (1920). In the federal courts, resale price maintenance contracts were held to
be in restraint of trade, and where commerce among the several states was involved, such
agreements violated § I of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (19ll).
90Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co., [1915] A.C. 847.
01 National Phonograph Co. of Australia v. Menck, [19ll] A.C. 336; Columbia Graphaphone Co. v. Thoms, [1924] 41 R.P.C. 294; Dunlop Rubber Co. v. Longlife Battery
Depot, L.R. I R.P. 65, 70 (1958). Contra rule in the United States: United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S.
490 (1917).
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of violation by an individual retailer on a few small items was
costly. As a result an alternative method of commercial enforcement was developed by the trade associations, namely, boycott in
.the form of stop-lists.92 All members of the trade association agreed
not to supply their products to any wholesaler or retailer put on a
stop-list. The boycott or money penalties assessed against price
cutters were administered by a system of extra-legal tribunals
within the trade association.93 Members or non-members of the
association were notified that someone had charged them with
price cutting and that failure to answer at the trade association
tribunal would result in their being cut off by all suppliers of the
product who were members of the association. Upon appearing
and being judged violators, the price cutters were either assessed
a money penalty or, if they refused to pay, were put on a stop-list.
The use of boycott as a technique of industrial self-government
had been upheld since the Mogul case94 against the charge that its
operation was in restraint of trade and therefore a tort of conspiracy against the boycotted party. Following this rule, the use of
trade association stop-lists to enforce resale price maintenance was
held legal in the Ware & De Freville case,95 defeating a claim that
they were in an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade and that
their publication was defamatory. The use of trade association
tribunals in administering stop-list enforcement and the assessment of money penalties against price cutters as an alternative to
boycott were upheld in the Thorne case.96 Trade associations were
thus vested by the courts with almost unlimited coercive regulatory power to enforce price maintenance by commercial boycott.97
Between 1920 and 1955, resale price maintenance in the United
Kingdom was subjected to four governmental investigations. The
first of these found resale price maintenance to be to the public
advantage in holding do,vn prices during inflation and assuring
92 GRETHER, REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN 284-300 (1935); l.EvY, RETAIL TRADE AssocJATIONS 137-61 (1942).
93 JOHNSON-DAVIES, THE PRACTICE OF PRICE MAINTENANCE 43-54 (1955).
94 See note 7 supra. Compare treatment of this problem, Part I supra, note 35,
95 Ware and De Freville v. Motor Trade Ass'n, [1921] 3 K.B. 40, 19 AL.R. 893 (1922).
In the United States, following the rule that collective boycotts are illegal per se, the use
of such boycotts to enforce resale price maintenance is also illegal. United States v. Bausch
&: Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S.
441, 454 (1922). See United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
96 Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass'n, [1937] A.C. 797, [1937] 3 All E.R. 157, 323.
97 The courts would not review or interfere with decisions of trade association tribunals unless they involved a violation of law or a patent violation of the association's
published rules. Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Great Britain, [1952] 2 Q.B. 329, [1952] I All
E.R. 1175. See JOHNSON-DAVIES, op. cit. supra note 93.
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middlemen a fair remuneration for services performed.98 To ensure that the maintained prices would be fair and reasonable, the
committee recommended that a tribunal be created to investigate
complaints of excessive charges, but this latter recommendation
did not receive action. The second report, in 1931, found price
maintenance schemes which result in withholding supplies of goods
from some retailers to be a public disadvantage.99 The Committee
recommended no legislation, however, finding that freedom of
contract, including the right to combine, were paramount public
interests. The third report was that of the Lloyd-Jacob Committee
in 1949.100 This report found that collective price maintenance
schemes and collective enforcement of resale prices "impeded the
development of economical methods of trading and prevented the
reduction of distributive costs and prices."101 It recommended
that these practices be rendered illegal. As to individual resale
price maintenance, however, the report recommended that it
should be allowed to continue and that means be devised to ensure
its effectiveness.
The Collective Discrimination report102 of the Monopolies Commission, the immediate impetus for passage of the Restrictive
Trade Practices Act of 1956, was the most recent government study
to treat resale price maintenance. The report found that individual price maintenance restricted the ability of distributors to compete with one another in price and denied consumers a choice
between methods of distribution.103 It found these effects intensified by horizontal agreements of producers to adopt resale price
maintenance since it discouraged the adoption of new marketing
methods. It also found collective action to enforce resale price
maintenance open to serious objection. It put coercive regulatory
power into the hands of trade association officials without effective
us Gt. Britain, Standing Committee on Trusts, Subcommittee on Fixed Retail Prices,
Findings and Decisions, CMD. No. 662 (1920).
llO Gt. Britain, Committee Appointed by the Lord Chancellor and the President of
the Board of Trade to consider certain trade practices, Report on Restraint of Trade (1931).
100 Gt. Britain, Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance,
CMD. No. 7696 (1949).
101 Id. at 33. This report was followed by a statement of the Labour Government of
its intention to introduce legislation to make individual as well as collective resale price
maintenance illegal. Gt. Britain, Board of Trade, A. Statement on Resale Price Maintenance, CMD, No. 8274 (1951). The legislation had not been introduced when the Labour
Government left office in November 1951.
102 Gt. Britain, Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Collective Discrimination: Report on Exclusive Dealing, Collective Boycotts, Aggregated Rebates and Other
Discriminatory Trade Practices, CMD. No. 9504 (1955).
10s Id. at 51.
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restraints on their arbitrary use of such power.104 The majority
of the Commission recommended that collective agreements to
adopt resale price maintenance or to enforce it be prohibited by
law.105

B. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956
Agreements between or among manufacturers merely to adopt
resale price maintenance, without provision for enforcement, come
under the registration requirements of the main body of the act,
Part I. They are horizontal price-fixing agreements, one of the
five categories of restrictions which must be registered pursuant
to section 6(1)106 and reviewed under section 21(1) of the act.107
It should be noted that individual resale price agreements are not
subject to registration under Part I of the 1956 Act. 108
Agreements for collective enforcement of resale price maintenance receive special treatment in Part II of the act.109 Section
24 makes horizontal agreements of sellers to boycott or discriminate against violators of resale price maintenance unlawful.110
104 Id. at 62. "Such agreements place in the hands of associations a power over
individual traders which we regard as excessive and dangerous."
105 Id. at 82-83. Although the Collective Discrimination report did not pass judgment
on individual resale price maintenance, one industry report, that on tires, did find its
use to be against the public interest (5-to-4 vote). Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission, Report on the Supply and Export of Tyres 132 (1955).
106 See § 6 (1) (a), note 22 supra. In the United States, under § 1 of the Sherman
Act, horizontal agreements to engage in resale price maintenance are illegal per se. United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945). The Miller-Tydings amendment
to the Sherman Act limits the resale price maintenance exception to agreements that are
solely vertical and specifically continues the illegality of horizontal agreements to establish
or maintain minimum resale prices. Act of August 17, 1937, c. 690, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1958).
101 See note 24 supra.
10s 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §§ 7 (2) and 8 (3). Registration is required only when two or
more parties accept one of the restrictions listed in § 6 (1). In the individual resale price
maintenance agreement, only one party, the buyer, accepts the resale price restriction.
Yamey, The Investigation of Resale Price Maintenance Under the Monopolies Legislation,
[1958] PUBLIC LAW 358, 359-60.
100 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §§ 24-27.
110 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 24 (1) states in part:
"Subject to the provisions of this section, it shall be unlawful for any two or more
persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom as suppliers of any goods to make
or carry out any agreement or arrangement by which they undertake " (a) to withhold supplies of goods for delivery in the United Kingdom from dealers
(whether party to the agreement or arrangement or not) who resell or have resold goods
in breach of any condition as to price at which those goods may be resold;
"(b) to refuse to supply goods for delivery in the United Kingdom to such dealers
except on terms and conditions which are less favourable than those applicable in the
case of other dealers carrying on business in similar circumstances; or
"(c) to supply goods only to persons who undertake or have undertaken to withhold
supplies of goods, or to refuse to supply goods, as aforesaid."
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Likewise, agreements among buyers to boycott or discriminate
against sellers who refuse to adopt resale price maintenance in
their selling is made unlawful.111 This section specifically outlaws
the extra-legal tribunals and money assessments by which trade
associations policed resale price maintenance. Even a recommendation by a supplier or dealer to another to engage in the named
acts is treated as an unlawful agreement, and all of the prohibitions also apply to trade associations.11 2 This section is not enforceable by criminal but by injunctive or other civil proceeding
brought by the Crown.11 3 Such proceeding is ·without prejudice
to the right of any injured party also to bring a civil action.
Individual resale price maintenance contracts and their enforcement are specifically exempted from the prohibitions of section 24.11 4 Section 25 goes even further by adding positive strength
to individual resale price maintenance, which for the first time is
made enforceable against non-signers of resale price contracts who
acquire the goods with notice that the goods are price-maintained.1115 In effect this overrules the decision in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co.,1 16 which prohibited enforcement against non-signers via the common law. This section applies
to all goods, not just to trademarked or branded commodities, and
may be applied even if the manufacturer has a virtual monopoly
m the commodity.117 A manufacturer may enforce resale price
111 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 24 (2).
&: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §§ 24 (4), 24 (5).
&: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § § 24 (6), 27 (7).
&: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 24 (3).
&: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 25 (1), as follows: "Where goods are sold by a supplier subject
to a condition as to the price at which those goods may be resold, either generally or by
or to a specified class or person, that condition may, subject to the provisions of this section, be enforced by the supplier against any person not party to the sale who subsequently
acquires the goods with notice of the condition as if he had been party thereto."
In the United States, state resale price statutes generally provide for enforcement
against non-signers. The California non-signer clause, the first to be passed, is typical.
It reads as follows:
"Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at
less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to this chapter,
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such
contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged
thereby." CAL. Bus. &: PROF. CoDE § 16904.
116 (1915] A.C. 847. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
117 Fulda, The Resale Price Maintenance Provisions of the Restrictive Trade Practices
Bill: An American Comment, 3 Bus. L. REv. 180 (1956). In the United States, state resale
price statutes uniformly apply only to trademarked or branded goods. Resale price maintenance, adopted in the United States pursuant to state statute, is exempt by federal
statute from antitrust prosecution only if the goods are sold "in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others. . . ." 50
Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). See Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947).
112 4
113 4
114 4
116 4
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maintenance against non-signers of resale price contracts by an
injunction, which will apply to all the manufacturer's goods thereafter acquired and resold by the defendant.11 8 It should be noted
that Part II of the act is enforced in the High Court, not in the
Restrictive Practices Court.

C. Court Decisions and Consent Orders Under 1956 Act
Four decisions have been rendered by the Restrictive Practices
Court under sections 6 and 21 of the 1956 Act concerning collective recommendations for resale price maintenance without provision for collective enforcement. The first two of these were in
the Scottish Bakers119 and British & Irish Bakers120 cases. In both
of these cases, resale price maintenance was auxiliary to and in
support of horizontal price-fixing agreements among the bakers.
Most of the bakers in the two cases did some retailing and the
primary purpose of the agreements was to fix the retail price of
bread in different areas. Since other sales were made by baker
members to independent retailers, it was necessary to protect the
bakers' own retail price fixing with a recommendation to independent retailers that they charge the Associations' announced
prices.
In both of these cases, the bakers' agreements on the wholesale
discounts from the recommended retail prices to be allowed to
independent retailers were defended under defense (g), that the
restriction was reasonably required for purposes connected with
maintenance of another restriction accepted by the parties.121 But
the main restrictions upon which these agreed discounts for independent retailers depended, the bakers' own fixed retail prices,
were in both cases held to violate the Restrictive Trade Practices
us 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 25 (4). Enforcement will be denied for any resale price
restriction which has been declared by the Restrictive Practices Court to be contrary to
the public interest. Sec. 25 (3).
119 In re Wholesale and Retail Bakers of Scotland Association's Agreement and In re
Scottish Association of Master Bakers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 347 (1959), [1959] 3 All
E.R.98.
120 In re Federation of "\'Vholesale and Multiple Bakers' (Great Britain and Northern
Ireland) Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 387 (1959), [1960] 1 W.L.R. 393, [1960] 1 All E.R. 227.
121 In re Wholesale and Retail Bakers of Scotland Association's Agreement, L.R. 1
R.P. 347, 374 (1959); In re Federation of Wholesale and Multiple Bakers' (Great Britain
and Northern Ireland) Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 387, 453 (1959). In a case decided after
this manuscript was written, collective adoption of resale price maintenance was held not
contrary to public interest where the main agreement of manufacturers to fix their prices
was held legal. In re The Cement Makers' Federation's Agreement, [1961] 2 All E.R. 75,
93-94.
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Act. 122 Hence, the court did not have to consider the validity of
the wholesale discounts in either case.
In the Carpet Manufacturers' case, as in the Bakers' cases, resale price maintenance was a supplemental reinforcement to a
horizontal price-fixing agreement among manufacturers.123 The
manufacturers' agreements fixed the wholesale prices, the prices
at which they would sell directly to large retailers. The manufacturers agreed to limit their other sales, at the 11 to 12½ percent
discount from announced wholesale prices, to wholesalers on their
Federation's approved list. Each wholesaler on the approved list
was required to sign a letter to the Manufacturers' Federation
whereby he agreed to accept the manufacturers' price to retailers
as his own minimum price to retailers.124 In this case, as in the
Bakers' cases, the collective agreement to adopt resale price maintenance, together with the primary agreement of the manufacturers for horizontal price fixing, was held contrary to the public
interest.125 The abrogation of the fixed wholesale discount, a key
aspect of resale price maintenance as it was imposed on the wholesalers in this industry, was likely to lead to greater wholesale markup or quantity discounts to wholesalers. The court found, however, that there was no reason to believe that this would increase
the price to the general public, since restoring price competition
both at the wholesale and manufacturers' levels was likely to result
in lower manufacturers' prices.126
The fourth case before the Restrictive Practices Court involving collective adoption of resale price maintenance was in the
motor vehicle industry.127 Before passage of the 1956 Act there
had also been collective enforcement of resale price maintenance
122 See text at notes 40, 41 supra. In the Scottish cases, the Court held the price
fixing not to confer specific and substantial benefits or advantages on the public under §
21 (1) (b) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. Public advantage from the price fixing,
allegedly resulting from price stabilization, from prevention of undue concentration in
production, and from maintenance of quality, was held not proved by the evidence. In re
Wholesale and Retail Bakers of Scotland Association's Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 347, 377-84
(1959). In the British and Irish case, the defense of public benefit or advantage under
§ 21 (1) (b) was also not proved. The court found that the recommended maximum prices
operated in fact as minimum prices and that the evidence did not show that the recommended prices were below what could be expected to prevail in a free market. In re
Federation of Wholesale and Multiple Bakers' Agreement, L.R. I R.P. 387, 462-472 (1959).
123Jn re Federation of British Carpet Manufacturers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 472
(1959), [1960] I All E.R. 356. See note 37 supra.
12¼ Id. at 530-31.
125 See text discussion at notes 37 and 57 supra.
126 L.R. I R.P. 472, 541-42.
127 In re Motor Vehicles Distribution Scheme Agreement, [1961] I All E.R. 161, [1961]
1 W.L.R.92.
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by trade association tribunals, money penalties, and boycotts.128
When collective enforcement became illegal under section 24 of
the 1956 Act, the British Motor Trade Association system of
market control was replaced by a new distribution scheme.129
Pursuant to this new trade association agreement, the previous
multiparty agreements between manufacturers and groups of distributors and dealers were replaced by numerous biparty vertical
agreements incorporating essentially the same terms.130 The new
scheme, inter alia, was a collective agreement to adopt resale price
maintenance. Although the new scheme provided no means for
enforcement, section 25 of the 1956 Act enabled enforcement by
the individual manufacturers against non-signers. The British
Motor Trade Association retained its investigation procedures,
utilizing "trap purchases" to secure evidence and prepare cases
for individual enforcement by one of the five major manufacturers.
The entire new distribution scheme of the British Motor Trade
Association was declared contrary to the public interest in this
latest decision.131 The parties had agreed to certain minimum
specifications and equipment for a firm to be appointed a franchised dealer. Only these firms were to receive the 17½ percent
dealers' discount off the prescribed retail prices. Franchised
dealers and distributors were allowed to resell to dealers in other
makes of cars or to non-franchised retailers at 10 percent or 12½
percent off retail price, depending on the class in which the Trade
Association listed the purchaser. Defendants denied that the
language of the first clause of the scheme was a collective agreement
to adopt resale price maintenance.132 The court found, however,
that the true intention of the distribution scheme was that all
128 Thome v. Motor Trade Ass'n, [1937] 3 All E.R. 157, 323, [1937] A.C. 797; JOHNSON·
DAVIES, THE PRACTICE OF PRICE MAINTENANCE (1955). Under this system of compulsory
industrial government, all automobile dealers were required to be members of the British
Motor Trade Association. See MAXCY AND SILBERSTON, THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 145-50 (1959).
129 186 ECONOMIST 683, 684 (Feb. 22, 1958). The five major automobile manufacturers
(producing 90% of British motor vehicles) and 80% of the dealers became members of the
new scheme on a voluntary basis.
130 These new vertical agreements were held exempt from registration under the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, § 8 (3). 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 8 (3). In re Austin Motor
Co. Ltd.'s Agreements, L.R. l R.P. 6 (1957).
131Jn re Motor Vehicle Distribution Scheme, [1961] I All E.R. 161, 179.
132 "Each signatory shall prescribe and may at any time vary as he shall in his own
unfettered discretion decide the retail prices of his products ... .'' [1961] I All E.R. 161,
174. During the hearing of the case, this language was varied in order to support the
argument that it was not a horizontal agreement to adopt resale price maintenance. The
amended clause was as follows: "Each signatory shall publish the retail prices of his
products (but may at any time vary such prices as he shall in his own unfettered discretion
decide) .•.." Id. at 181.
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manufacturers would maintain retail prices and that the scheme
would not work without resale price maintenance.1133 'Since
respondents, in arguing that they had no agreement to adopt resale price maintenance, had failed to defend this clause of their
agreement, it was held contrary to the public interest under section
21 (I) of the act.
Termination of collective agreements to adopt resale price
maintenance ·was one of the terms of nine out of the first 50 consent orders ending restrictive agreements registered under the
1956 Act.134 These included semirotary wing pumps, domestic
electric cookers, building bricks, concrete mixers, hard fibre cord,
garage equipment, electric light fittings, metal bedsteads and hard
fibre rope. In all of these industries there was also horizontal price
fixing among the manufacturers, so that the resale price maintenance could have been merely auxiliary to those primary agreements. In four of these industries-building bricks, concrete
mixers, garage equipment, and electric lighting fixtures-there
were also agreements to sell only to buyers on a certified list. This
would likely be evidence of collusive pressure among the buyers,
who would also try to enforce their own horizontal price fixing by
causing manufacturers to adopt resale price maintenance.
The one reported case involving application of the section 24
prohibitions on collective enforcement of resale price maintenance
was in the grocery trade.135 In this trade, resale price maintenance
existed primarily because of the pressures of trade associations of
small retailers and wholesalers.136 Starting in late 1956, when
collective enforcement of resale price maintenance became illegal,
major chains in the grocery trade began to cut prices on packaged
133 Id. at 176.
134 See Appendix, Table II, orders dated April 21, 1959 (no. 630), June 22, 1959
(no. 106), July 16, 1959 (no. 599), Oct. 14, 1959 (nos. 958, 2373), Feb. I, 1960 (no. 619),
Feb. 15, 1960 (no. 793), April 26, 1960 (nos. 579, 1226), July 4, 1960 (no. 617).
135 Board of Trade v. Northern Council of Grocers' Ass'n, 188 ECONOMIST 397 (August
2, 1958). For a survey of the other types of restrictive agreements in the grocery field on
file with the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, see Cuthburt &: Black, Restrictive Practices in the Food Trades, 8 J. INDUS. EcoN. 33 (1959).
136 KUIPERS, REsALE PRICE l\fAINTENANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN wmr SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE GROCERY TRADE 63-69 (1950). Changing technology in grocery distribution toward
larger self-service stores with high turnover and lower unit costs tended, under price
competition, to drive many small, service-oriented stores out of business. "The most
important reason ••• for the survival of the small-scale grocer would appear to be the
growth of the practice of branding and resale price maintenance in this trade." JEFFERYS,
RETAIL TRADING IN GREAT BRITAIN 1850-1950, 173 (1954). Most wholesale grocers sold
primarily to these small stores and were therefore interested in protecting them from the
new competition. The large chains of self-service stores bought directly from manufac•
turers and did their own distributing to their stores.
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groceries.137 Most grocery manufacturers hesitated to use the new
power in section 25 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act allowing individual enforcement of price maintenance against nonsigners. They wanted lower retail prices and higher sales now that
possible organized grocer boycotts, which had forced high distribution mark-ups, were illegal.138 Furthermore, a permanent injunction could keep one manufacturer's goods at high retail prices
while his rivals took sales away from him by ignoring retail price
cutting and refusing to adopt or enforce resale price maintenance
for their goods. In the summer of 1958, the Northern Council of
Grocers, representing I 0,000 independent grocers, called for a
boycott to induce manufacturers to enforce their announced resale price maintenance. The Council notified six major food
manufacturers by letter that unless they acceded to this demand
within 28 days the "Council intends to recommend to all members
that they shall discriminate against your company and its products."189 The Board of Trade filed an action on behalf of the
Crown under section 24 (7) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act
to enjoin this boycott. On hearing of the petition, the President
and Secretary of the Council gave undertakings not to recommend
the boycott to the Council members and the action was terminated without issuance of the formal injunction.140
The first case involving private enforcement of individual resale price maintenance in the Chancery Division under section 25
of the act was in the automobile industry.141 The case resulted
in a consent decree in which defendant non-signer was permanently enjoined from reselling any motor vehicles manufactured
by plaintiffs at other than resale prices prescribed by plaintiffs.
The court also ordered an inquiry into what damages, if any, had
been sustained by plaintiffs by the violations of the defendant in
the past.142 During the first year of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, motor industry manufacturers brought and won six
137 Comment: Attack on Fixed Prices, 8 CARTEL 42, 43 (April 1958); Pollard &: Hughes,
Recent Trends in British Retailing, WF.STMINSTER BANK R.Ev. 6, 9 (August 1959).
138 West, Price Maintenance in the U.K., 7 CARTEL 79 Guly 1957); 188 ECONOMIST 23
Guly 5, 1958).
189 Comment: Within 28 Days, 8 CARTEL 110, 113 (Oct. 1958).
140 188 ECONOMIST 397 (August 2, 1958).
141 Austin Motor Co. &: Morris Motors Ltd. v. Prince, Times (London), Dec. 8, 1956, 3.
142 Johnson-Davies, Price Maintenance Under the Restrictive Trade Practices .A.ct 1956,
4 Bus. L. R.Ev. 163, 164 (1957).
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cases against violators of individual resale price maintenance.148
There is no complete record of trial court decisions under this
section nor any measure of the number of price cutters who
ceased their violations merely on threat of prosecution.144
Two major cases have been litigated interpreting the language
of section 25.145 The first of these was Goodyear Tyre & Rubber
Co. v. Lancashire Batteries Ltd.,1 46 which concerned the meaning
of "notice of the condition" of resale price maintenance as applied
to non-signers. Defendant, retailer of auto accessories, received a
circular from the British Motor Trade Association designed to
explain the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The circular contained lists of names and addresses of manufacturers in the industry
whose goods were price-maintained and the fact that established
prices could be obtained from the named firms. Plaintiff Goodyear was on the list as was the fact that its tires were price-maintained. After receiving the circular, defendant sold tires at I 0
percent below list.147 He defended the action for injunction on
the ground that the circular from the Association, the only notice
he had received, was not express notice of the established prices
since there were no prices listed in that circular. The Chancellor
held for defendant, noting that a statute which interferes with
freedom of trade is to be strictly construed and that defendant
14S 186 ECONOMIST 683 (Feb. 22, 1958). Of these cases, two concerned automobiles;
two, tires; and two, spark plugs. Id. at 684.
1-H One reported injunction was issued by consent in the selling of razor blades by
a non-signer. Gillette Industries Ltd. v. Miller's Bargain Stores Ltd., Times (London)
July 9, 1958, 4. Another permanent injunction against a non-signer, owner of cut-price
food stores involved cigarettes. Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Deeming, Times (London), June
15, 1960, 8; 195 ECONOMIST 1238 Gune 18, 1960).
145 Two minor decisions concerned the application of the statute to goods sold about
the time it became effective, Nov. 2, 1956. In County Laboratories Ltd. v. Mindel, L.R. 1
R.P. 1, (1957] Ch. 295, it was held that the statute did not apply to a jar of price-maintained
Drylcreem where defendant, non-signer retailer, had no way of ascertaining if the original
sale by manufacturer to wholesaler took place before or after Nov. 2, 1956. See Wedderburn, Restrictive Practices-Resale Price Maintenance-Registration of Agreements, [1957]
CAMn. L.J. 121; 101 SoL. J. 806 (1957). In Dunlop Rubber Co. v. Longlife Battery Depot,
L.R. 1 R.P. 65 (1958), the 1956 statute was held not violated where plaintiff failed to
prove that defendant non-signing retailer bought the price-maintained tires after Nov. 2,
1956.
146 L.R. 1 R.P. 22 (Ch. 1958), reversed, L.R. 1 R.P. 29 (C.A. 1958).
147 The sale violating the act was in a "trap order" by an investigator of the British
Motor Trade Association. Quaere: Does the policing of price maintenance by a trade
association constitute collective enforcement in violation of § 24 of the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act? Wedderburn, Contract-Resale Price Maintenance-Notice of Conditions
[1958] CAMn. L.J. 163, 165.
'
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should have been given express notice of the established prices.148
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, however, holding that
notice that the class of goods was price-maintained was sufficient
where defendant could then easily find out the established prices.140
The second major case under section 25 was Beecham Foods
Ltd. v. North Supplies Ltd.150 In this case, plaintiffs sold Lucozade,
a glucose drink, pursuant to resale price maintenance. The label
on the bottles stated the price as "2s. 6d." followed by "plus 3d.
deposit returnable on bottle with stopper." The case arose from
two "trap purchases" made from defendant retailer at a total price
of 2s. 7d. per bottle. The judge denied an injunction, holding that
there was no violation of the statute. The plaintiff's claim that his
established price was 2s. 9d. was rejected in light of the printing
on the bottle. The court found that defendant merely chose to
charge ld. for hire of the bottle instead of 3d.151 Only the sale, and
not the hire of goods, is subject to resale price enforcement against
non-signers under section 25. The key question of fact in judging
this case was not before the court: when the customers returned
bottles were they refunded ld. or were they given 3d., thereby cutting the established resale price?152 This opinion must be viewed
as a strict construction of the statute in favor of freedom to trade.
The particular evasion illustrated here, as the judge pointed out,
can be remedied by a more accurate use of language.1153

Conclusions
The prohibition on collective enforcement of resale price maintenance since 1956 has had a marked impact on marketing in the
148 L.R. I R.P. 22, 88 (Ch. 1958). In the United States, state resale price statutes
allow recovery for "willfully and knowingly" advertising, offering for sale or selling a
price-maintained good at less than the stipulated price. A recent decision holds that, under
such statute, direct notice of the prices fixed is unnecessary if it can be proved that
defendant knew the products were price-maintained. Revlon, Inc. v. Janel Sales Corp.,
198 N.Y.S. (2d) (Sup. Ct. 1960). There are few cases directly ruling on this issue. I
CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) iJ 3268.
149 L.R. I R.P. 29 (C.A. 1958). See Grunfeld, Resale Price Maintenance-Notice to
"Non-Signers," 21 l\:foDERN L. REv. 682 (1958); Korah, Restrictive Practices IV: Resale
Price Maintenance, 26 SoL. 201 (1959); 102 SoL. J. 627 (1958); 108 L.J. 614 (1958); 74 L.Q.
REv. 469 (1958).
150 L.R. I R.P. 262 (Ch. 1959).
151 It is a debatable question whether this transaction operates in the market as a
bailment of bottles or a sale with a power to return them. Korah, Resale Price 1.faintenance - "Resale,'' 23 MODERN L. REv. 88 (1960).
152103 SoL. J. 665 (1959).
153 Blanco White, Price Maintenance in English Law, [1959] J. Bus. L. 241, 243.
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United Kingdom. Boycott as the instrument of trade association
coercion against price cutters has been ended. In fact, the Tobacco
Trade Association, whose primary purpose had been to enforce
resale prices, was voluntarily dissolved at the passage of the 1956
Act.1 M Price rivalry has become extensive in groceries since passage of the act; 165 and new price competition was also reported in
the other trades, such as tires.156
Although the Restrictive Trade Practices Act strengthened individual resale price maintenance by, for the first time, allowing
legal enforcement against non-signers, this section has not been
greatly utilized. For items like groceries, in which the impetus for
resale price maintenance comes from organized retailers, the manufacturers have no interest in enforcement. In the litigated cases
where price maintenance was adopted by manufacturers as an
adjunct to their own horizontal price fixing, it has been held contrary to the public interest. It is unlikely that these manufacturers
will engage in resale price maintenance individually when their
rivals might now encourage distributors' price cutting. Furthermore, since the end of trade association control of industry through
boycott, the entry of new firms which will engage in aggressive
price rivalry can be expected.
Resale price maintenance today in the United Kingdom has
the legal status it had in the United States from the passage of the
Miller-Tydings antitrust exemption in 1937 to about 1951. Since
1951, there has been a continuing decline even in the individual
resale price maintenance that was legal in 45 out of the 48 United
States. High profits on price-maintained goods has been one factor
promoting the entry into retail markets of the so-called discount
houses.167 These self-service stores, specializing in high-volume
goods in their own private brands and openly violating price maintenance on other goods, have taken a large share of appliance sales
and other trades. The size of their sales is probably sufficient in
many cases to induce manufacturers not to enforce resale price
maintenance. While this change in marketing has taken place,
180 ECONOMIST 549 (Aug. 18, 1956).
note 137 supra; 194 EcoNoMIST 1251 (March 26, 1960).
11',0 192 ECONOMIST 453 (Aug. 15, 1959).
157 Hearings Before Senate Select Committee on Small Business, Discount-House Operations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 411 (1958), citing estimates by Business Week 158-59 (April
3, 1954), of 10,000 discount houses in the United States. Discount houses now claim to
make one-third of total U.S. department store sales. Business Week 67 (Feb. 25, 1961).
llH

155 See
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new legal barriers have arisen to resale price maintenance in the
United States. Between 1950 and 1960, the highest courts of eighteen states held non-signer clauses of state resale price maintenance
statutes to violate state constitutions.1118 In 1957, it was held that
mail order sales of price-maintained goods at cut prices by firms in
states without price maintenance statutes into states with price
maintenance statutes could not be enjoined.1119 In a few cases, an
injunction against violators of price maintenance has been denied
where there has been discriminatory enforcement or a failure to
gain compliance by others.160 These factors have led many firms
to consider resale price maintenance to be practically unenforceable and caused them to drop price maintenance as a marketing
policy.1a1
Since 1956 resale price maintenance has declined substantially
in both the United Kingdom and in the United States. In the
United Kingdom a government committee urged reconsideration
of the individual resale price maintenance which remains legal
with a view toward prohibiting even that.162 Such an inquiry has
been initiated by the Board of Trade.163 In the United States, in
many areas, enforcement of resale price maintenance has become
infeasible. There have been pressures, primarily by retail trade
associations, for passage of a federal law for the enforcement of
resale price maintenance.164 So far, such bills have met strong
opposition of consumer groups and have failed to pass. It is unlikely that such protection against free competition in the distributive trade will become law as long as business is prosperous. In
158 See citations and analyses of cases in Conant, Resale Pnce Maintenance: Constitutionality of Nonsigner Clauses, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1961).
159 General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co. of Washington, D.C., Inc., 244
F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957), 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 374 (1957);
Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co. of Washington, D.C., 240 F.2d 684
(4th Cir. 1957).
160 John H. Breck, Inc. v. Alexander's Dep't. Stores, Inc., 1960 CCH Trade Cas. ,r 69,749
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); Mead Johnson & Co. v. Alexander's Dep't. Stores, Inc., 1960 CCH
Trade Cas. ,i 69,780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); Max Factor & Co. v. Avenue Merchandise Corp.,
1960 CCH Trade Cas. ,I 69,795 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
161 H.R. REP. No. 467, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 7 (1959); Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Fair Trade, 1959, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 387,
701, 739-41 (1959).
162 Gt. Britain, Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, First Report 48 (1958).
163 [1960] J. Bus. L. 373; 194 EcoNO!IUST 1251 (March 26, 1960).
164 S. 1083, H.R. 1253, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), to amend § 5 (a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
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both the United States and the United Kingdom, however, if a
severe business recession develops, the fact that economic protectionism is not a cure for recession and can only hinder recovery
will be drowned by the pleas of the small business group for
legalized price fixing.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
DECISIONS OF THE RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES COURT
Case

Decision

Major Restrictions

Defenses•

Chemists Federation

Exclusive selling of patent medicines to registered pharmacists

a
b

Not proved
Not proved

Cotton Yarn Spinners

Mlnhnum price fixing

n
b
f

Withdrawn
Not proved (except for weavers and doublers and to them,
outweighed by detriments)
Proved but outweighed by detriments
Withdrawn

e

Blanket Manufacturers

Minimum price fixing
Minimum quality (weight)
Minor restrictions

b
b
b

Not proved
Proved and held to outweigh detriments
Not proved

Water-Tube Boilermakers

Price fixlnii (level tendering) }
Allocation of customers

b
d
f

Not proved
Not proved
Proved and held to outweigh detriments

Scottish Bakers (2 cases)

Minimum price fixing
Recommended retailers' margin

b

Not proved

British and Irish Bakers

Maximum price fixing
Recommended retailers' margin

b

Not proved

Carpet Manufacturers

Minimum price fixing
Fixed wholesalers' discount
Boycott unapproved wholesalers

b

Not proved
Not proved

f

Phenol Producers

Minimum price fixing

b

Not proved

Black Bolt and Nut Producers

Minimum price fixing to private buyers
Minimum price fixing to government
Discriminatory quantity discounts

b
b
b

Proved and held to outweigh detriments
Not proved
Not proved

1Sce

note 24 for the seven defenses as defined In section 21(1) of the Restrictive Practices Act, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 68, §21(1).
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TABLE II
RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES CONSENT ORDERS
Registration
Number

Trade Assoclatlon or Product

Number of
Parties

Dates of
Orders

'--'

Types of Restrictions Terminated

April 22, 1958 .... Prices, rebates, and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules

5S6

Corrugated Paper Makers •••••••••••••••••

693

Fractional Horsepower Motors .•••••••.•••• not stated ••• April 22, 1958 .... Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fbi:ed by pre-agreed schedules

210

Constructional Steel ......................

295

Feb. 2, 1959 ..... Prices and terms of sale fi:ced by pre-agreed schedules

269

Cotton Varn Doublers ....................

127

March 20, 1959 •• Prices and terms of sale fi:ced by pre-agreed schedules

14

c.o
,__.

0)

t:d

a:x:

759

Northern Iron & Coal Importers .••••••••••

82

313

Radio Valves (Radio & Cathode Ray Tubes).

9

April 8, 1959 ..... 1, Sell only to buyers on pre-agreed list and at pre-agreed discounts
2. Limit Imports to 10% of domestic sales
3, Import new type tubes only after notice to Association

880

Road Roller Manufacturers,.,.,.,,.,,,.,, .

4

April 8, 1959 ..... Prices and terms of sale fi:ced by pre-agreed schedules

~

603

Semi-rotary Wing Pumps, •••.• ,,, ••. ,,,, •.

3

April 21, 1959 .••. 1. Prlces and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2. Sell only subject to fixed resale price maintenance
3, Supply only on condition that spare parts will be purchased from seller

~

818

Electric Resistance Furnaces, , , •• , , . , .• , , , .

6

April 21, 1959 .... 1, Prices and terms of sale fi:ced by pre-agreed schedules
2. Notify and consult on prices and terms of sale for special orders
3, Not supply parts for furnace purchased from another member

176

North-Eastern Group of Flour Millers• •• , ••.

124

783

South-Eastern Group of Flour MIiiers•.,.,,.

110

776

Scottish Flour Millers Ass'n• .• ,. , , , ••• , , , , •

40

782

Incorporated National Association of British
and Irish Ml!lers, Ltd.• •• , ................ approx. 220

1599

Scottish Flour MIiiers Ass'n•.,,., .•••••• , , .

16

1652

Belfast Flour MIiiers Ass'n• .• , .•• , .•.• , ••..

20

784

Incorporated National Assoclatlon of British
and Irish MIiiers, Ltd,•

All members
or regional
ass'ns

March 25, 19S9 •• Prlces fixed by pre-agreed schedules

1. Limit flour grades to six
\May 26, 19S9 .. ·( 2, Recommend prices, d!scoun ts, bag charge, and allowance for bulk transport
3, Register of factors entitled to factors' allowance

en

::l
~

....

z

>

g
z

)M.,, "· '"'· .. l 2. Register of participants, millers and factors

1, Scheme of deferred rebates for large buyers of home-mllled flour

May 26, 1959, •• , 1. General aasoclatlon agreement
2, Factor allowance of ls 6d per sack If he agrees to sell at MIiiers' general sell!ng
price

•Official consent order not yet released, Restrictions listed here are expected to be terminated by official order, Source: Compiled from consent orders on file at the Office of the
Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements,

00

c.o

c.o

RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES CONSENT ORDERS-Continued
Registration
Number

Trade Association or Product

308

Pneumatic Tools (concrete breakers, rock
drills, etc.)

Number of
Parties

Dates of
Orders

Types of Restrictions Terminated

9

June 22, 1959,, •• 1,
2.
3,
4.

June 22, 1959 .••. Same Items as No. 308 above

1301

Air Compressors: Portable,, , • , •.....• , .•..

7

106

Domestic Electric Cookers .•••...•.....••..

13

tO
0
0

June 22, 1959., .• 1.
2.
3.
4.

Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
Supply tools to trade association standards and warranty
Not supply replacement parts for tools purchased from another member
Not adopt similar design, construction, or external appearance of tools of
another member
Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
Limit sales through architects to approved channels
Sell to wholesalers only subject to fixed resale price maintenance
Supply obsolete cookers only after notice to Association

~
....

C')

....::i::

914

Rubber Proofers .. , ........ , ....•....... , •

11

June 22, 1959 .. ,. 1. Prices, terms of sale, and services offered to customers fixed by pre-agreed
schedules
2. Use only processes conforming to agreement

~

508

High Conductivity Copper .•••.. , ....... , .

18

July 16, 1959. , , , 1. Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fixed by pre-arranged schedules
2, Prohibition on supply of goods at firm prices Irrespective of market fluctuations

t""'

961

Midland Bottlers (beers) .... , ........ , ....

19

July 16, 1959 ••• , 1. Prices and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2. Supply bottling services for other bottlers only If they adhere to Association
rules

478

Twist drllls .•.. ,, .. , .• , •... ,.,,,,,,,.,.,,

29

July 16, 1959. , •• 1, Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2. Not to supply certain sizes of drllls wherever alternative sizes arc possible

599

North of England Bulldln11: Bricks, , •.• , .• , •

18

July 16, 1959 ••• , 1,
2,
3,
4.

354

Galvanized Tank Manufacturers ••••••• ,, •.

15

July 16, 1959 •••• 1. Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2. Not to supply tanks of certain specified gauges

486

Light Ed11:e Toola ......... , ...............

52

July 16, 1959 •• , . Prices, discounts, and terms of sale for each functional class of buyers on
approved lists fixed by pre-agreed schedules.

943

Washed Sand and Gravel (Scotland) ••••• , • ,

5

July 23, 1959 •••• 1. Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2, Supply only on condition that Association secretary administer collection of
accounts
3. Not supply to customer on Association list of overdue accounts

Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
Sell only subject to fixed resale price maintenance
Supply only to users or merchants included In Association register
Not supply to a user who Is two months In arrears In payment of his account
to any member
5. Not supply bricks of size greater tban prescribed by Association

~

i~
~
(jl

tO

595

I Washed Sand and Gravel (Mld-ScoUand) ••••
Wuhed Sa.nd and Gravel .................. 1

1712

626
958
2373

837

I Agricultural Twine Manufacturers •••••••••• I

3
8

I

,__.

July 23, 1959 •••• , Same as No, 943 above
July 23, 1959. • • • lnter-AMoclaUon arrangments between Assoclatlom In No, 943 and No, 595:

1. Not to sell In each other's trade area at prices or terms or sale other than those
set by local association
2, Agree not to acquire sand and gravel from a producer not a party to this
agreement

13

,__.

._.

I Oct. 5, 1959 ••••• I 2.1. Sell
Prices, discounts, and terms of sale fixed by pre-agreed schedules
only at delivered prices to dealers on Association list
3, Agree to minimum size or orders which will be filled

I

Concrete Mixer Manufacturers Ass'n . ...... ,

I

Glass Benders Ass'n ..................... • 1

8
11

8

Oct. 14, 1959 •••• 1,
2,
3,
4.

Plate Glass Ass'n ................. ,, ......

450

619

I Hand Fibre Cord and Twine ............... I

21

618

I Trawl Twine Manufacturers Ass'n, ....•.•• , I

9

278

I Master Process Engravers ...... , ....• , • , , , I

247

I Feb. 1, 1960, ... ,I

793

I

Garage Equipment Ass'n, ....• , ..... , , , .. , I

373

I Feb. 15, 1960 ••• , I 1,

I

Prices, terms and guarantees fixed by pre-agreed schedules
Minimum size for mixers per agreement
Not sell to dealer under exclusive contract to other member
Sell 1mrsuant to resale price maintenance contracts

Dec, 16, 1959 •••• 1, Prices, terms, and discounts fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2. Limitation on type of binding services

821

91

tO

0)

Dec. 16, 1959. , •• 1. Minimum annualJlurchases by members
2, Price, terms and lscount fixed by pre-agreed schedules with preferential discounts to members
3, Limitations on size or glass sold

I Feb. 1, 1960 •• , , • I 1,

Prices, terms and discounts fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2, Limitations on sizes and types of product
3, Sell pursuant to resale price maintenance

I Feb. 1, 1960 •••• , I 1.

Prices, terms, discounts and allowances fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2, Limitations on size and types of products

1. Prices, terms, discounts and allowances fixed by pre-agreed schedules
2. Acquire goods only from another member If this Is possible
2,
3,
4.
5,

Exclusive dealing with members clause conditioning all sales
Not change announced prices or terms without seven days notice to association
Sell only at announced prices and pursuant to resale price maintenance
Not supply goods on consignment basis
Agreed discount schedules by class of customer

Tuyere Makers' Ass'n (blast furnace pipe) •••

4

1132

Spring and Interior Springing Ass'n. , , , , • , .•

40

Feb, 15, 1960 •••• 1, Prices, terms, discounts and allowances fixed by pre-agreed schedules

579

Electric Light Fittings Ass'n, .• , ..... , , • , • ,

27

April 26, 1960, •• , 1. Adhere to announced list prices less discounts and allowances for each class
of customer as fixed by pre-agreed schedule
2. Sell to distributors only subject to resale price maintenance
3, Exclusive selling to wholesalers for decorative fittings
4. Limitations on types and sizes or products

b:j

~

j

c,,

:i::

>
z

~

Cl>

1-j

...

z

§
z0

Feb, 15, 1960 •••• 1, Delivered prices, terms, and take-In allowances fixed by pre-agreed schedules

tO

0
,__.

c.o
0

.N)

RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES CONSENT ORDERS-Continued
Registration
Number

Trade Association or Product

Number of
Parties

1226

Metal Bedstead Ass'n .... , .....•. ,,, ... ,,,

15

2045

Zinc Oxide Federation. , ..... , ....• , , ... , .

5

512

Associated Paving and Kerb Manufacturers

393

Dates of
Orders

Types of Restrictions Terminated

April 26, 1960,, .. 1. Prices, terms and discounts fixed by pre-agreed schedule
2, Sell only ~rsuant to resale price maintenance
3, Not deal used products
April 26, 1960 .. , . 1, Delivered prices fixed by pre-agreed formula
2, Terms, discounts and packaging fixed by pre-agreed schedules

~
....

13

April 26, 1960,,,, 1. Delivered prices, terms and discounts fixed by association committee
2. Report all Inquiries about offers to association
3. Supply only to customers, In quantities, and from areas approved by associatlon

....::i::
~

Dyers' and Finishers' Ass'n.,,,., •..... ,,,.

78

May 23, 1960, , .. 1. Prices, terms, and discounts fixed by pre-agreed schedule

499

Makers of Wood Free Paper •. , , . , .•• , , • , .

30

May 23, 1960, ••. 1. Prices, terms, and minimum quantities fixed by pre-agreed schedule

610

Rusk Manufacturers' Federation (cereal filler)

15

May 23, 1960,.,, 1. Prices, terms and discounts for each class of customer fixed by pre-aiireed
schedule

548

Bath Manufacturers' Ass'n, , , , , •• , •. , , , , ..

19

July 4, 1960. , , , . 1. Price, terms, discount and carriage charges for each class of customer fixed by
pre-agreed schedules
2, Sell at delivered prices In Great Britain, but not elsewhere

640

Glycerine Producers Ass'n,.,, •. , • , , , , , •...

43

July 4, 1960 .• , •• 1. Prices, terms and conditions of sale fixed by association council
2, Sell only to industrial users or through this association

617

Hard Fibre Rope Manufacturers .• , •.• ,,,,.

21

July 4, 1960,,.,, 1.
2,
3.
4.
5.

Prices, terms and discount to each class of customer fixed by association
Sell at delivered prices In Great Britain
Resale price maintenance on some classes of customers
Limits on technical standards
Minimum quality standards

C')

z

[

i
,-,

~
CJ't

c.o

